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ABSTRACT
THREE ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL
MACROECONOMICS AND FINANCE
MAY 2017
JUAN ANTONIO MONTECINO
B.A., UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
M.Sc., BARCELONA GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS /
UNIVERSITAT POMPEU FABRA
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Arslan Razmi
This dissertation studies the macroeconomic and social impacts of two increas-
ingly common macroeconomic policies: restrictions on international capital mobility
– capital controls – and so-called unconventional monetary policy – often referred to
as “quantitative easing.” The consensus view is that capital controls can e↵ectively
lengthen the maturity composition of capital inflows and increase the independence
of monetary policy but are not generally e↵ective at reducing net inflows and in-
fluencing the real exchange rate. The first essay presents empirical evidence that
although capital controls may not directly a↵ect the long-run equilibrium level of
viii
the real exchange rate, they may enable disequilibria to persist for an extended pe-
riod of time relative to the absence of controls. Allowing the speed of adjustment to
vary according to the intensity of restrictions on capital flows, it is shown that the
real exchange rate converges to its long-run level at significantly slower rates in coun-
tries with capital controls. This result holds whether permanent or episodic controls
are considered and is robust to controlling for di↵erences in exchange rate regimes,
domestic monetary conditions, and other country characteristics. The benchmark
estimated half-lives for the speed of adjustment are around 3.5 years for countries
with strict capital controls but as fast as 2 years in countries with no restrictions on
international capital flows.
The second essay studies the social welfare implications of capital controls when
controls are imperfectly binding and financial markets actively aim to bypass reg-
ulation. I consider a series of models of a small open economy featuring a “Dutch
disease” externality arising from excessive capital inflows, as well as strategic inter-
actions between a regulatory authority attempting to enforce capital controls and
a financial sector attempting to evade them. In contrast to most existing theoreti-
cal models, which assume perfectly enforceable capital controls, the e↵ective tax on
capital inflows in this essay is endogenously determined by the interplay of the ad-
ministrative capacity of domestic regulators, the complexity or sophistication of the
financial sector, and the existence of regulatory loopholes. The models suggest that
capital controls, by internalizing externalities associated with capital inflows, can im-
prove welfare relative to a “laissez-faire” benchmark even when these are imperfectly
binding. Moreover, when evasion is costly and the probability of avoiding detection
ix
by the regulator is a↵ected by the evasion choices of financial actors, capital controls
will have more traction and can drive a greater wedge between domestic and inter-
national financial markets. However, this implies that the economy?s ?first-best?
outcome can no longer be achieved as a decentralized equilibrium using capital con-
trols. This is because bank evasion activity represents a pure waste from a societal
perspective and can be thought of as a type of deadweight loss.
The impact of the post-crisis Federal Reserve policy of near-zero interest rates and
Quantitative Easing (QE) on income and wealth inequality has become an important
policy and political issue. Critics have argued that by raising asset prices, near-zero
interest rates and QE have significantly contributed to increases in inequality, while
practitioners of central banking, counter that the distributional impact have proba-
bly been either neutral or even egalitarian in nature due to its employment impacts.
Yet there has been little academic research that addresses empirically this important
question. The third and final essay uses data from the Federal Reserve’s Tri-Annual
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) to look at the evolution of income by quan-
tile between the “Pre-QE period” and the “QE period” analyzing three key impact
channels of QE policy on income distribution: 1) the employment channel 2) the
asset appreciation and return channel, and 3) the mortgage refinancing channel. Us-
ing recentered influence function (RIF) regressions pioneered by Firpo et. al (2007)
in conjunction with the well-known Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition technique, I find
that while employment changes and mortgage refinancing were equalizing, these
impacts were nonetheless swamped by the large dis-equalizing e↵ects of asset appre-
ciations. In order to identify causality, I propose a simple counterfactual exercise
x
building on the extensive literature on macroecomic impacts of QE in order to place
well defined upper and lower bounds on possible net causal magnitudes. I conclude
that QE led to modest increases in inequality despite having some positive impacts
on employment and mortgage refinancing.
xi
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CHAPTER 1
CAPITAL CONTROLS AND THE REAL EXCHANGE
RATE: DO CONTROLS PROMOTE DISEQUILIBRIA?
1.1 Introduction
Once considered heretical to the tenets of prudent macroeconomic policy, in re-
cent years capital controls have regained respectability in o cial policy circles and
received fresh attention among academics as potential macro-prudential tools.1 In
the wake of the global financial crisis and mounting evidence of the destabilizing
e↵ects of unregulated international capital flows, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), previously the champion of capital account liberalization, reversed decades of
o cial policy recommendations and declared that capital controls should once again
be included in a country’s “policy toolkit.”2 At the same time, as expansionary mon-
1A growing theoretical literature has shown that capital controls improve welfare in models fea-
turing financial amplification dynamics arising from collateral constraints (Lorenzoli [84], Jeanne
and Korinek [65], Korinek [72], Korinek [74], Davis and Presno [28], Liu and Spiegel [83], Heathcote
[59]). In these types of models, capital flows impose externalities because private agents fail to inter-
nalize the contribution of their borrowing decisions to systemic risk. As a result, the decentralized
equilibrium is characterized by “over borrowing” and is ine cient. Capital controls in this context
can be seen as a Pigouvian tax to force agents to internalize the externality. Capital controls have
also been shown to improve welfare in small open economies with fixed exchange rates and rigid
nominal wages (Farhi and Werning [40], Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe [114]).
2Examples of work by IMF sta↵ articulating this change in opinion are Ostry et al. [96], Ostry
et al. [95], and Ostry et al. [94]. These new perspectives on the role of capital controls became
part of the IMF’s “institutional view” late in 2012 (IMF [62]).
1
etary policy in industrial nations has flooded emerging markets with foreign funds,
a number of countries have imposed restrictions on capital inflows, specifically citing
a concern with excessive exchange rate appreciation and a desire to preserve export
sector competitiveness. This shift in opinion regarding the use of capital controls has
taken place along with a growing recognition that some rapidly industrializing na-
tions, in particular China, have benefitted from so-called “neo-mercantilist” policies
and have used capital controls to deliberately maintain an undervalued real exchange
rate.
These calls for the greater use of capital controls to manage the real exchange rate
stand at odds with the empirical literature on the e↵ectiveness of controls, which has
not found clear evidence that controls can influence this variable (for detailed reviews
of this literature see Engel [36] and Magud et al. [87]). Several empirical studies have
focused on Chile’s experience with capital controls during the 1990s, which sought to
limit short-term capital flows in order to stabilize the economy and prevent unwanted
exchange rate appreciation (Valde´s-Prieto and Soto [116], Edwards [32], De Gregorio
et al.[29], Gallego et al. [50], Forbes [46]). While most of these studies conclude
that Chile’s capital controls had a meaningful impact on the maturity composition
of net inflows, the results suggest either a very small and short-term e↵ect on the real
exchange rate (e.g. De Gregorio et al. [29]), or no significant e↵ect at all (Gallego et
al. [50]).3
3It is worth noting that there exists some evidence that Chile’s capital controls may have had
a significant e↵ect on the nominal exchange rate. Edwards and Rigobon [33] show that capital
controls slowed the appreciation of the Chilean Peso and decreased its volatility.
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Cross-country and case studies of other capital control episodes have reached
similar conclusions (Levy-Yeyati et al. [80], Baba and Kokenyne [4], Klein [71],
Jinjarak et al. [66], Alfaro et al. [1], Forbes et al. [45]. For example, Baba and
Kokenye [4] look at the e↵ects of capital controls in emerging markets during three
di↵erent episodes in the 2000s – the foreign exchange tax in Brazil (2008), and the
URRs in Colombia (2007-08) and Thailand (2006-08) – and one episode of capital
outflow liberalization – South Korea (2005-08). Their results show that controls
during the 2000s appear to have successfully altered the maturity composition and
lowered the overall volume of flows in Colombia and Thailand. Controls also appear
to have successfully preserved monetary policy independence in Brazil and Colombia,
albeit temporarily. However, their results provide no evidence that controls in any
country were able to successfully influence the real exchange rate.
This paper presents new empirical evidence on the adjustment dynamics of the
real exchange rate towards its long-run equilibrium in the presence of capital controls.
In contrast with previous approaches, I explicitly model the adjustment dynamics
of the real exchange rate as a function of the intensity of capital controls. Using a
large panel of developed and developing countries, I show that while capital controls
may not a↵ect the equilibrium level of the real exchange rate, controls can substan-
tially slow its speed of adjustment towards this long-run level, causing disequilibria
to persist for extended periods of time. Specifically, this paper uses panel dynamic
ordinary least-squares (DOLS) to estimate the long-run cointegrating relationship
between the real exchange rate and a set of fundamentals. This equilibrium rela-
tionship is used to calculate the extent of real under or overvaluations – that is, of
3
disequilibria – which are then imposed on an error-correction model to study the
short-run adjustment dynamics towards equilibrium.
The empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis that capital controls
slow the speed of adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium and therefore allow
real exchange rate disequilibria to persist for longer periods of time relative to the
absence of controls. The point estimates from the baseline model imply half-lives
for the adjustment of disequilibria of roughly 3.5 years in countries with stringent
restrictions on international financial transactions but as short as 2 years in countries
with completely open capital accounts. These results therefore imply considerable
di↵erences in real exchange rate adjustment dynamics between countries depending
on the intensity of capital controls. Moreover, these findings are not sensitive to
whether permanent or temporary capital controls are considered, nor are they driven
by a country’s nominal exchange rate regime.
This paper is related to the vast literature on the empirical determinants of ex-
change rates. While a detailed review of this literature is beyond the scope of this
paper, textbook treatments are provided in Sarno and Taylor [112] and Macdonald
[86]. A recent strand in this literature argues that in the long-run the real exchange
rate is pinned down by real fundamentals, including the relative productivity of the
tradable sector (the Balassa-Samuelson e↵ect), the terms of trade, and the net foreign
asset position (Chinn and Johnson[22], Chinn [23], Cashin et al. [21], Bayoumi et al.
[8], Ricci et al.[102], Bordo et al. [17]). Although this literature is diverse, the unify-
ing theme is to treat the real exchange rate as nonstationary and use cointegration
techniques, emphasizing explicit equilibrium relationships.
4
My results also shed light on the policy issue of real exchange rate misalignment.
It has long been recognized that real overvaluations can negatively impact growth
and may precede currency crises. Moreover, a growing literature has shown that there
exists a robust relationship between an undervalued real exchange rate and faster
economic growth (see, for example, Rodrik [103] and Rapetti et al.[100]). These
positive growth e↵ects have been explained through a variety of channels: sectoral
misallocation of capital due to government and market failures (Rodrik [103]); hidden
unemployment in an underdeveloped dual economy (Razmi et al.[101]); or learning
by doing externalities in the tradables sector (Korinek and Serven [75]). What all
these models have in common, however, is the importance for long-run growth of
the tradable sector and the potential to use undervaluation as a development tool.
But how exactly should policymakers wield this new tool? It is poorly understood
how a persistent undervaluation can actually be achieved and whether restrictions on
capital mobility can play a role.4 Another contribution of this paper is therefore to
help fill this gap. The empirical results presented below suggest that capital controls
are capable of promoting real exchange rate misalignment for extended periods of
time, and may therefore serve as an e↵ective instrument to manage the real exchange
rate.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 provides a brief
review of the standard empirical determinant of the real exchange rate and possible
theoretical channels. Section 1.3 describes the dataset and econometric methodology
4A notable contribution is Jeanne [64].
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used in the empirical analysis. Section 1.4 presents the benchmark results while
section 1.5 discusses a series of robustness exercises accounting for the role of the
nominal exchange rate regime, as well as additional forms of group heterogeneity.
The final section provides concluding remarks.
1.2 The Equilibrium Real Exchange Rate and its Determi-
nants
Purchasing power parity (PPP) is perhaps the oldest theory of exchange rate
determination and states that after accounting for the domestic prices of goods and
nominal exchange rates, all national currencies should have the same purchasing
power.5 This proposition is derived from the Law of One Price (LOP), which holds
that in the absence of frictions such as transaction costs or other barriers to trade,
international goods trade should cause all identical goods to trade for the same price
across markets after converting into a common currency. Otherwise, it would be
possible to profit through arbitrage and thus prices would eventually equalize across
countries. Despite its appealing simplicity, empirical evidence suggests that PPP
often fails to hold even as a long-run proposition (see, e.g., O’Connell [92], Engel
[35], Pesaran [98]).
A classic explanation for the failure of PPP is the relative productivity channel,
which can be traced to Balassa [6] and Samuelson [111]. This is the so-called Balassa-
5The modern formulation of PPP is due to the Swedish economist Gustav Cassel in the early
20th century but elements of the doctrine can be traced to as far back as the Salamanca school in
16th century Spain.
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Samuelson e↵ect, which in its simplest form predicts that countries with higher
productivity in the tradable goods sector will tend to have more appreciated real
exchange rates.6 Intuitively, consider a small open economy with a tradable and
non-tradable sector. Suppose further that PPP holds but only for tradable goods.
Productivity growth in the tradable sector will tend to raise wages in both sectors
and create upward pressure on prices. However, since the price of tradable goods is
pinned down by the world market, this will lead to an increase in the relative price
of non-tradables, or in other words a real exchange rate appreciation.
The Balassa-Samuelson e↵ect has proven remarkably robust since its first test by
Balassa [6]. Two examples of recent empirical confirmation of the Balassa-Samuelson
e↵ect are Lothian and Taylor [85] and Chong et al. [25]. Employing a new semi-
parametric approach, Chong et al. estimate the cointegrating relationship between
the real exchange rate and productivity in a panel of 21 OECD countries at a quar-
terly frequency. Their novel local projection approach makes it possible to purge
the e↵ects of short-run shocks and frictions and yields strong confirmation of the
Balassa-Samuelson e↵ect. Lothian and Taylor use nearly two hundred years of data
for the US, UK, and France to test the presence of the Balassa-Samuelson e↵ect in an
explicitly nonlinear framework that allows volatility shifts in the nominal exchange
rate across monetary regimes. Their results suggest that the Balassa-Samuelson ef-
fect explains nearly 40 percent of variations in the sterling-dollar real exchange rate
over the whole sample. Additional recent confirmation of the Balassa-Samuelson
6Some authors prefer to refer to this as the “Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson” e↵ect due to early
insights from Harrod [58].
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e↵ect is provided by Bordo et al. [17], who use historical data for 14 countries cover-
ing four distinct monetary regimes: the classical gold standard, the war and interwar
years, Bretton Woods, and the post-Bretton Woods managed floats. They show
that the traditional Balassa-Samuelson model cannot explain the small empirical ef-
fect of productivity on the real exchange rate or the substantial heterogeneity in its
magnitude across monetary regimes. Modern versions of the model, including those
that allow a role for product di↵erentiation and terms of trade channels, fit the data
much better. In particular, plausible shifts in structural parameters due to changes
in monetary regimes can explain the historical variations in the Balassa-Samuelson
e↵ect and help reconcile discrepancies in estimates across countries. Bordo et al. [17]
conclude: “although the Balassa-Samuelson e↵ect tends to vary across regimes, the
evidence suggests that it is present, and in the long-run the real exchange rate is not
constant but conditioned on relative income levels.”
Another standard long-run determinant of the real exchange rate is the net foreign
asset position. Interest in the impact of net foreign asset holdings on international
relative prices dates back at least to the time of Keynes during the 1920’s debate on
the so-called transfer problem. Contemporary textbook models of an open economy
predict a positive relationship between stocks of foreign assets and the relative price
of non-tradable goods (e.g. Vegh [117]). Since foreign assets represent a claim on
tradable goods, an exogenous increase in foreign assets raises the supply of tradables
and should lead to an increase in the relative price of non-tradables. Early empir-
ical evidence of a positive association between net foreign asset stocks and the real
exchange rate is provided by Gagnon [49] and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti [77]. More
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recent studies that find a positive and significant e↵ect include Ricci et al. [102] and
IMF [63].
Changes in the terms of trade can also a↵ect the real exchange rate and may help
explain the long-run failure of PPP. In his 1930 A Treatise on Money, Keynes noted
that a major problem with the theory of purchasing power parity is its neglect of
the influence of the terms of trade on the real exchange rate, which “not only upsets
the validity of [its] conclusions over the long period, but renders them even more
deceptive over the short period. . . ”7 It is well understood in standard open economy
macroeconomic models that improvements in the terms of trade can lead to a real
appreciation of the exchange rate.8
Other potentially important determinants of the real exchange rate include gov-
ernment expenditure and demographic factors, most notably population growth.
Government expenditure is expected to influence the real exchange rate through
its e↵ect on aggregate demand and the price level. It may also produce a real appre-
ciation since public spending tends to be more concentrated on non-tradable goods
and services (see, for example, De Gregorio and Wolf [30], Arellano and Larrain
[3], Chinn [23]). Although demographic factors have not received much attention in
the equilibrium real exchange rate literature, higher fertility may appreciate the real
exchange rate by raising consumption associated with child-rearing, which mainly
7Originally cited by Cashin et al. [21].
8One such textbook treatment is Chapter 4 of Vegh [117], which presents a simple intertemporal
model of a small open endowment economy with three sectors: exportables, importables, and non-
tradables. In this simple setup, wealth and intertemporal substitution e↵ects both lead to a real
appreciation following an improvement in the terms of trade and all that is required is for all goods
to be normal.
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Table 1.1: Sample description
Number of countries by World Bank group classifications
Income Classification Geographic Classification
East Asia & Pacific 8 High Income: OECD 26
Europe & Central Asia 13 High Income: nonOECD 10
Industrial 25 Upper Middle Income 23
Latin America & Caribbean 19 Lower Middle Income 21
Middle East & North Africa 7 Low Income 8
South Asia 1
Sub-Saharan Africa 15
consists of non-tradables. Rose et al. [108] present a formal model and empirical
evidence of this channel.
1.3 Data and Empirical Framework
In order to estimate the e↵ect of capital controls on the persistence of real ex-
change rate disequilibria, I construct a dataset consisting of an unbalanced panel of
88 countries observed at a yearly frequency over the period 1980-2011. The sample
is largely dictated by data availability and contains a mix of high, middle, and low
income countries. Table 1.1 provides a breakdown of the sample composition by
geographic regions and country income groups.9
Most of the variables come from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics
(IFS) and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI).10 The depen-
dent variable of interest is the natural logarithm of the real e↵ective exchange rate
(REER), which is an index constructed on the basis of a weighted average of each
9The full set of countries included in the sample are listed in Appendix A.2.
10See the note for Table 1.2 for further details.
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Table 1.2: Summary statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Long run variables
Log Real E↵ective Exchange Rate (REER) 4.626 0.371 2.278 7.685
Log PPP GDP per capita (LNY ) 8.588 1.270 4.621 11.723
Net Foreign Assets / Imports (NFA) -1.082 3.121 -41.475 30.253
Short run variables
Log Commodity Terms of Trade (TOT ) 4.732 0.374 2.675 6.421
Government Expenditure / GDP (GOV ) 0.163 0.065 0.020 0.762
Population Growth (POP ) 0.017 0.016 -0.181 0.175
Currency Crisis Dummy (CRISIS) 0.034 0.182 0.000 1.000
Capital control indices
Schindler Index – Overall (SCH) 0.315 0.350 0.000 1.000
Schindler Index – Inflow (SCHIN ) 0.285 0.331 0.000 1.000
Schindler Index – Outflow (SCHOUT ) 0.345 0.397 0.000 1.000
Schindler Index – Equity (SCHEQ) 0.313 0.365 0.000 1.000
Schindler Index – Collective Investment (SCHCI) 0.300 0.372 0.000 1.000
Klein Episodic Controls (KLEIN) 0.011 0.075 0.000 1.000
Chinn-Ito Financial Openness Index (CHITO) 0.098 1.549 -1.864 2.439
Note: Each variable was obtained from the following sources. REER: IMF International Financial
Statistics. LNY : World Development Indicators. NFA: External Wealth of Nations Database
(Lane and Milesi-Ferretti [78]). TOT : IMF World Economic Outlook Database. GOV : World
Development Indicators. POP : World Development Indicators. CRISIS: Broner et al. [18].
SCHj : Fernandez et al. [41]. KLEIN : Klein [71]. CHITO: Chinn and Ito [24].
country’s bilateral exchange rates vis-a´-vis its trading partners deflated by its rela-
tive price level, where the weights reflect the importance of trade with each partner.
The long-run variables included in the cointegrating relationship are the following:
log PPP GDP per capita (LNY ) , and net foreign assets divided by total imports
(NFA). The short-run determinants of the real exchange rate are: log commodity
terms of trade (TOT ), government expenditure to GDP (GOV ), annual population
growth (POP ), and a dummy variable for the advent of currency crises (CRISIS).
Summary statistics are presented in Table 1.2.
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Naturally, a key consideration is the appropriate measurement of capital controls.
In the broadest sense, capital controls refer to any administrative or market-based
restriction on cross-border financial flows. These can range from outright prohibitions
on the ownership of domestic assets by foreigners, to simple taxes on foreign exchange
transactions or international borrowing. Capital controls may also be imposed either
on a small subset of specific assets categories, or across the board, restricting or
otherwise regulating international transactions in all types of financial instruments.
A further distinction can be made between controls on capital inflows – that is, when
foreigners acquire domestic assets – and controls on capital outflows – when domestic
residents increase their holdings of foreign assets.11
Measures of capital controls fall into two broad categories: so-called de jure and
de facto indexes. De jure indexes attempt to measure legal or regulatory barriers
to international financial transactions while de facto measures, on the other hand,
capture the actually existing level of financial integration in a given country, often
by observing macroeconomic outcomes. The vast majority of de jure-type indexes
are based on information contained in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Ar-
rangements and Restrictions (AREAR), a yearly publication documenting changes
in IMF member country laws and regulations governing international financial trans-
11In addition to these distinctions, capital controls can also cover a wider and more subtle range
of regulations governing capital inflows. For example, domestic monetary authorities may require
firms to deposit a fraction of funds borrowed abroad in non-interest bearing accounts for a specified
period of time. These “unremunerated reserve requirements” or URR, as they have come to be
known, have been used most famously in Chile during the 1990s and in Colombia during the 2000s.
Countries may also enforce so-called “minimum stay” requirements on foreign direct investment,
barring the entry of short-term and potentially speculative investments.
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actions. A major problem with de facto measures of capital controls is that they are
potentially as much an endogenous outcome variable as they are an indicator of re-
strictions on capital flows. As such, de facto indexes are poorly suited for empirical
studies where the aim is to ascertain the e↵ect of a policy change since they do not
actually measure changes in a government’s intention to restrict flows.
For this reason, I will primarily use the de jure index developed by Schindler
[113], the so-called “Schindler index”, which is based on detailed textual analysis
of the AREAR and has also recently been updated to cover a larger number of
countries and years by Fernandez et al. [41]. The Schindler index is an average of
the number of international transaction categories with any restrictions for a given
year and country. Thus, the index ranges from zero – indicating that the country
has no capital controls on any category – to one – when a country has controls on
every transaction category. For example, between 1995 and 2011 Mexico’s Schindler
index averaged 0.5, suggesting that half of all transaction categories had some form
of restriction during that time period. As noted by Quinn et al.[99] in a thorough
assessment of the most common measures of capital controls, the Schindler index is
by far the most granular, covering a large range of disaggregated financial instruments
and distinguishing between controls on inflows and outflows. There is, however, one
major drawback of using the Schindler index that is worth noting. The AREAR
only started publishing the detailed country reports on which the Schindler index
is based starting in 1995 and as a result the index is only available in subsequent
years. Moreover, because the index is based on textual analysis, its construction is
labor intensive and does not include all IMF member countries. Thus, the sample
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used when investigating the short-run adjustment dynamics with capital controls is
shorter, spanning 1995 to 2011, and includes less countries (43 compared to the 88
for the long-run analysis).
Figure 1.1 provides a broad overview of the relative prevalence of capital controls
across regions and levels of development. As can be seen in Panel (a), large di↵er-
ences in the extent of capital account liberalization persist, on average, across country
income groups. Perhaps not surprisingly, low income and lower middle income coun-
tries had tighter capital controls on the books throughout the 1995-2011 period, with
restrictions on roughly 40 percent and 60 percent of transaction categories, respec-
tively. Large variation in the prevalence of capital controls is also evident across
regions. South Asian economies had the tightest capital controls on average, with
restrictions on roughly 85 percent of transaction categories. Latin American and
Caribbean countries, in contrast, had nearly the loosest capital controls, second only
to industrialized economies.
Seven di↵erent measures of capital controls are considered in the benchmark re-
gressions. The first five are the Schindler index for overall restrictions on international
capital flows (SCH) and several subindexes for restrictions on inflows (SCHIN), out-
flows (SCHOUT ), equity transactions (SCHEQ), and collective investments (SCHCI).
In addition, I consider episodic capital controls (KLEIN) as defined by Klein [71].
As discussed in greater detail below, the Klein index extends the Schindler index
to distinguish between permanent and episodic restrictions on capital mobility. As
such, the two intensity measures have roughly the same interpretation as the aver-
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Figure 1.1: Average intensity of capital controls by income group and region
(a) By income groups
Lower mid income
Low income
Upper mid income
High income: nonOECD
High income: OECD0
.2
.4
.6
Av
g.
 C
ap
ita
l C
on
tr
ol
 In
te
ns
ity
1995 2000 2005 2010
year
(b) By geographic groups
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Sub-Saharan Africa
South Asia
Middle East & North Africa
Latin America & Caribbean
Industrial
Europe & Central Asia
East Asia & Pacific
Overall Inflows Outflows
Note: This figure reports the average value of the Schindler index for overall capital controls
(SCH) broken up into the World Bank’s country income (panel a) and geographic group (panel
b) classifications. In panel (b), “Overall” refers to the Schindler index for both controls on capital
inflows and outflows while “inflows” and “outflows”, respectively, refer to the disaggregated indexes
for restrictions on capital inflows and outflows.
age number of transactions with controls. As a robustness exercise, I also use the
well-known Chinn-Ito index of financial liberalization from Chinn and Ito [24].
The order of integration of each variable was determined using the panel unit
root tests proposed by Pesaran [98], Im et al. [61], and Levin et al. [79]. In all
three tests the null hypothesis is that the series have a unit root. The results for all
three tests on all the main variables are reported in Table 1.3. All three tests fail to
reject the null hypothesis that the level of the real exchange rate is non-stationary
but easily reject the null for its first di↵erence. This indicates, consistent with the
literature discussed above, that the real exchange rate is likely I(1) and therefore it
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Table 1.3: Panel unit root tests.
CADF IPS Levin-Lin-Chu
Zt bar p-value Wt˜ bar p-value Adj. t⇤ p-value
REER -1.192 0.117 -1.250 0.106 0.511 0.695
 REER -8.299 0.000 -24.711 0.000 -16.236 0.000
LNY 3.477 1.000 5.023 1.000 1.960 0.975
 LNY 29.403 0.000 -23.104 0.000 -15.529 0.000
NFA 5.141 1.000 -0.782 0.217 0.115 0.546
 NFA -8.211 0.000 -26.294 0.000 -18.860 0.000
TOT -1.129 0.130 -0.279 0.390 -0.432 0.333
 TOT -11.098 0.000 -34.173 0.000 -24.462 0.000
POP 4.488 1.000 -35.720 0.000 -27.552 0.000
 POP -6.420 0.000 -33.785 0.000 -28.940 0.000
GOV 0.904 0.817 -2.065 0.020 -0.700 0.242
 GOV -10.406 0.000 -34.596 0.000 -24.774 0.000
SCH 3.379 1.000 0.868 0.807 -0.353 0.362
 SCH -0.413 0.340 -24.390 0.000 -15.331 0.000
CHITO 0.885 0.812 -0.833 0.202 1.704 0.956
 CHITO -3.413 0.000 -37.726 0.000 -28.469 0.000
Note: Pesaran’s CADF test is implemented in Stata by Lewandowski [82]. The CADF test consid-
ers the case with 2 lags, a constant, and cross-sectional demeaning. Both the Im-Pesaran-Shin and
Levin-Lin-Chu tests include a time trend and common AR coe cient. The panel-specific lag-orders
were chosen using the BIC.
will be treated as such in the empirical analysis that follows. The three tests also
suggest that LNY , NFA and TOT are first-di↵erence stationary. As such, these are
also treated as I(1). The results are somewhat ambiguous for population growth and
government expenditure. Although Pesaran’s CADF test fails to reject the null for
POP , the IPS and LLC tests do reject the unit root null hypothesis. The results for
GOV are similarly ambiguous: the unit root null is rejected by the IPS test but not
by the CADF or the LLC tests. In addition, the panel unit root tests suggest that
both the SCH and CHITO measures of capital controls can be treated as I(1).
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Table 1.4: Panel cointegration tests
Panel-Specific Pooled
Gt G↵ Pt P↵
REER, LNY , NFA -1.533* -4.954 -12.914*** -3.448**
REER, LNY , NFA, TOT -1.650 -5.412 -14.482** -4.638
REER, LNY , NFA, SCH -1.853 -2.050 -6.452 -1.522
REER, LNY , NFA, CHITO -1.831 -5.777 -12.221 -3.710
Note: This table reports the Z-values from the Westerlund [118] panel cointegration tests. The null
hypothesis is no cointegration. All tests consider the case with one lag and panel specific intercepts.
These tests were implemented in Stata by Westerlund and Edgerton [119]. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
The variables were tested for cointegration using the panel error-correction tests
proposed by Westerlund [118] and implemented by Westerlund and Edgerton [119].
These tests are derived from a panel error-correction model that allows for hetero-
geneity in the error-correction dynamics, including panel-specific intercepts, trends,
and slopes. The test statistics are based on the idea that if the series are cointe-
grated, the coe cient on the error-correction term should be significantly negative.
Westerlund develops four alternative statics, two of which are constructed by aver-
aging the estimated coe cients (G↵) and t-statistics (Gt) from each panel-specific
error-correction term. The latter two are calculated by pooling observations across
panels and estimating the error-correction term (P↵) and t-statistic (Pt).
Test results are shown in Table 1.4. Three of the four test statistics reject the
null hypothesis of no cointegration for the model including REER, LNY , and NFA.
Results for the model including the log terms of trade are inconclusive: only one of
the three test statistics rejects the null of no cointegration. This is consistent with
results presented by Cashin et al. [21], who showed that the real exchange rate
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may only be cointegrated with the terms of trade in so-called commodity currency
countries.12 Given the inconclusive evidence of a cointegrating relationship, TOT is
treated as a short-run determinant of the real exchange rate and omitted from the
baseline specification of the long-run level. Finally, Table 1.4 also reports results
for tests of a long-run relationship between REER, NFA, and two complementary
measures of capital controls: SCH and CHITO. All four test statistics fail to reject
the no cointegration null. This suggests that capital controls do not have a long-run
e↵ect on the equilibrium real exchange rate. However, as we shall see below, this
does not rule out significant e↵ects on the short-run disequilibrium dynamics of the
real exchange rate.
The cointegrating relationship is estimated using the method of dynamic or-
dinary least-squares (DOLS) proposed by Saikkonen [110]. As Saikkonen shows,
the cointegrating relationship can be consistently and e ciently estimated by OLS
adding leads and lags of the first di↵erenced cointegrated variables with Newey-West
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors. Because
REERi,t is an index and does not contain information about the relative level of the
real exchange rate, the model includes country fixed e↵ects. The inclusion of country
fixed e↵ects also addresses potential omitted variable bias. Year dummies are also
12Cashin et al. [21] uncover evidence of significant cross-country heterogeneity in the relationship
between the real exchange rate and the terms of trade. They find significant cointegrating relation-
ships between the real exchange rate and the terms of trade but only in around one third of the
countries in the sample. This suggests that the long-run equilibrium exchange rate is only driven
by the terms of trade in so-called “commodity currency” countries. However, for these commodity
currencies, movements in the terms of trade explain a remarkably large amount of the variation in
the real exchange rate. Their estimates imply that nearly 85% of real exchange rate variations are
due to the terms of trade.
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included to control for common time factors. The estimated long-run equilibrium
equation is given by
REERi,t =  i + ↵t +  xi,t +
⇢X
j= ⇢
⌘ xi,t j + ei,t (1.1)
where  i and ↵t are vectors of country and year fixed e↵ects, respectively, xi,t is a
vector of I(1) variables cointegrated with REERi,t, and the fourth term on the right
hand side is the set of leads and lags of  xi,t. The error term ei,t captures short-
run deviations from the long-run relationship and can be interpreted as the extent
of real exchange rate disequilibria. A positive ei,t implies the real exchange rate is
overvalued while a negative value implies an undervaluation. To estimate how fast
deviations from the long-run equilibrium are eliminated, the estimated residuals, eˆi,t,
are imposed on the error-correction model (ECM) in equation (1.2):
 REERi,t = ⇥i,teˆi,t 1 + ↵ xi,t +  zi,t + ui,t (1.2)
where
⇥i,t = ✓1 + ✓2SCHi,t (1.3)
The ECM is augmented with a vector of short-run stationary variables zi,t. These
include the annual change in the government expenditure to GDP ratio ( GOV ),
population growth (POP ), the log growth of the commodity terms of trade ( TOT ),
and a dummy for currency crises (CRISIS). The coe cient ⇥i,t measures the speed
of adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium and varies across both countries and
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years. Consistency between equations (1.1) and (1.2) requires ⇥i,t < 0. Otherwise,
ei,t would be non-stationary and therefore REERi,t and xi,t cannot be cointegrated.
Rather than allowing unlimited heterogeneity, the speed of adjustment is modeled
as a function of a constant base-rate ✓1 and an additional term that depends on
the intensity of capital controls. Hence, the speed of adjustment is captured by the
marginal e↵ect of eˆi,t on  REERi,t:
@ REERi,t
@eˆi,t 1
=
8>><>>:
✓1 if SCHi,t = 0 (no capital controls)
✓1 + ✓2 if SCHi,t = 1 (full capital controls)
(1.4)
If capital controls slow the speed of adjustment and cause disequilibria to persist for
longer periods of time, then ⇥i,t should be smaller in absolute value when controls
are present. This requires ✓1 < 0, ✓2 > 0, and |✓2|  |✓1|. The latter restriction
ensures that the system is stable and that disequilibria are not explosive.
Putting the pieces together, the empirical strategy is to estimate the long-run
equilibrium relationship (1.1) and use the residuals to estimate the ECM in (1.2).
To estimate the e↵ect of di↵erences in capital controls on the speed of adjustment,
the di↵erent measures of capital control intensity are interacted with the lagged
residuals. Therefore, a positive and statistically significant coe cient on the inter-
action term would confirm the hypothesis. The ECM is augmented with a lagged
dependent variable to account for potential persistence in short-run real exchange
rate movements and a full set of country and time dummies to deal with unobserv-
able short-run time-invariant and country-invariant factors. Since the introduction
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of a lagged dependent variable in a fixed-e↵ects framework introduces dynamic panel
bias (Nickell bias), the ECM is estimated using two-step GMM.
1.4 Benchmark Results
The results for the benchmark equilibrium real exchange rate level regressions are
presented in Table 1.5. I consider a variety of specifications for the long-run relation-
ship, including a simple model where the long-run real exchange rate only depends
on log GDP per capita. These results appear in column (1). The coe cient is pos-
itive, indicating that an increase in productivity leads to a real appreciation, and
statistically significant at the one percent level. Its magnitude is also economically
significant and consistent with the existing literature: a one percent in increase in
GDP per capita leads to roughly a quarter of a percent increase in the real exchange
rate. Column (2) considers another stripped down model where the equilibrium
REER depends solely on NFA. Consistent with the literature, a higher net foreign
assets position has a statistically significant positive e↵ect on the real exchange rate.
In particular, a one standard deviation increase of NFA leads to a six percent real
appreciation. Next, column (3) considers the log commodity terms of trade which,
as expected, has a positive coe cient. However, the estimate is not statistically
significant. The specification in column (4), which will serve as the baseline for
the error-correction models estimated below, includes both LNY and NFA simul-
taneously. Both coe cients have the expected signs and are significant at standard
significance levels.
21
Table 1.5: Long-run cointegrating relationship
Dependent Variable: REER
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log PPP GDP Per Capita (LNY ) 0.254*** 0.226*** 0.266***
(0.051) (0.048) (0.066)
Net Foreign Assets / Imports (NFA) 0.019* 0.023** 0.022**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Log Terms of Trade (TOT ) 0.091 0.070
(0.057) (0.054)
Error-Correction Term
eˆt 1 -0.210*** -0.186*** -0.204*** -0.192*** -0.186***
(0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.033)
Observations 2,191 2,191 2,173 2,191 2,173
Countries 88 88 88 88 88
R-squared 0.585 0.572 0.556 0.598 0.601
RMSE 0.193 0.196 0.199 0.190 0.189
Country FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The benchmark DOLS specification includes one lead and two lags of the di↵erenced long-
run explanatory variables. Results are robust to di↵erent lag lengths. The coe cient and standard
error estimates for the leads and lags are not reported. Full results are available upon request.
Robust HAC standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
To compare with the results below, in each level specification I report the error-
correction term for a simple ECM with homogenous adjustment dynamics. The speed
of adjustment ranges from a low of 0.19 to a high of 0.21, indicating that roughly
a fifth of the disequilibria are eliminated each year. These estimates are consistent
with previous studies and, in particular, are very close to those reported by Ricci et
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al. [102], who report an adjustment speed of 0.2. As a reference, these estimated
adjustment speeds imply half-lives on average of roughly 3 years.13
The results for the ECM with heterogenous adjustment dynamics in (1.2) are
shown in Table 1.6. The lagged residual eˆi,t 1 corresponds to the baseline level speci-
fication in column (4) of Table 1.5. As described above, the ECM is augmented with
a lagged dependent variable and a full set of country and time dummies. Because
the combination of a lagged dependent variable and fixed country e↵ects introduces
Nickell bias, the model is estimated using two-step GMM. The baseline ECM speci-
fication is reported in column (1), which includes an interaction term between eˆi,t 1
and the Schindler index of capital control intensity (SCH). The first thing to note
is that the results appear to support the hypothesis that capital controls slow the
speed of adjustment towards long-run equilibrium. Specifically, the interaction term
has a positive and significant coe cient that is smaller in absolute value than the
coe cient on eˆi,t 1. The Hansen J statistic test for the over identifying restrictions
fails to reject the null hypothesis while the Kleibergen-Paap statistic for testing for
weak instruments does reject the null. This indicates that the model is well spec-
ified and that the lagged levels of the real exchange rate are good instruments for
 REERi,t 1.
As discussed above, the speed of adjustment is measured by the marginal e↵ect of
eˆi,t 1 on  REERi,t. The baseline results are consistent with the hypothesis that the
13The adjustment speed half-life can be calculated as follows. Setting all short-term covariates
equal to zero, the half-life is given by: HL = ln(1/2)/ ln(1 + ✓ˆ), where ✓ˆ is the estimated error-
correction term.
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marginal e↵ect increases with the intensity of capital controls – that is, the speed of
adjustment is slower the higher the intensity of controls. This is depicted graphically
in Figure 1.2, along with the 95 percent confidence interval. The di↵erent adjustment
dynamics based on the intensity of capital controls can also be depicted graphically
as a phase-diagram in (ei,t 1, REERi,t)-space. A dynamically stable equilibrium
relationship requires a downward sloping curve, where steeper slopes correspond to
faster adjustment dynamics. This is shown in Figure 1.3 for two cases: no capital
controls (SCH = 0) and full capital controls (SCH = 1). The “phase arrows”
portray the dynamic directions of motion. Specifically, whenever ei,t 1 < 0 and the
real exchange rate is undervalued,  REERi,t > 0 and thus the undervaluation is
gradually eliminated. As can be seen in Panel (a), when controls are absent the real
exchange rate rapidly adjusts to eliminate disequilibria (a steeper adjustment curve).
However, when controls are set at their full intensity in Panel (b), the adjustment
curve is flatter and disequilibria are corrected more sluggishly.
The remaining columns in Table 1.6 report results from using alternative mea-
sures of capital controls. The specifications in columns (2) and (3) consider the e↵ects
of controls exclusively on capital inflows and on capital outflows, respectively. These
results are not very di↵erent from the baseline specification, although the point esti-
mates for the interaction term with SCHIN and SCHOUT are slightly smaller. Taking
full advantage of the granularity of the Schindler index, I also examine if controls on
some types of financial instruments are more e↵ective than others. Columns (4) and
(5) report results using the SCH subindexes for equities and collective investments,
respectively. These results are very similar to the baseline estimates in column (1),
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Table 1.6: Error-Correction Models
Dependent Variable:  REER
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
eˆt 1 -0.289*** -0.274*** -0.288*** -0.300*** -0.285*** -0.253*** -0.222***
(0.039) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.036) (0.031) (0.034)
eˆt 1 · SCH 0.100**
(0.051)
eˆt 1 · SCHIN 0.091*
(0.051)
eˆt 1 · SCHOUT 0.079*
(0.042)
eˆt 1 · SCHEQ 0.122**
(0.049)
eˆt 1 · SCHCI 0.100**
(0.043)
eˆt 1 ·KLEIN 0.154**
(0.069)
eˆt 1 · CHITO -0.022**
(0.010)
 REERt 1 0.150*** 0.148*** 0.153*** 0.156*** 0.149*** 0.145*** 0.176***
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.063)
CRISIS -0.220*** -0.221*** -0.220*** -0.221*** -0.221*** -0.221*** -0.148***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.025)
 GOV 0.707** 0.710** 0.706** 0.702** 0.733** 0.721** 0.880***
(0.326) (0.326) (0.326) (0.336) (0.317) (0.322) (0.265)
POP 1.761** 1.806** 1.734** 1.781** 1.781** 1.951** 2.626**
(0.786) (0.792) (0.789) (0.787) (0.781) (0.823) (1.114)
 TOT -0.020 -0.020 -0.021 -0.021 -0.018 -0.024 -0.043
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.036)
Observations 707 707 707 707 707 707 1,380
Countries 48 48 48 48 48 48 59
R-squared 0.414 0.413 0.414 0.417 0.417 0.414 0.319
RMSE 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.055 0.055 0.056 0.086
Hansen J Stat (p) 0.755 0.726 0.786 0.744 0.740 0.691 0.267
Note: Each ECM is estimated with two-step GMM using the residuals from the DOLS regression
in Table 1.5. All specifications include lagged di↵erences of the long-run variables LNY and NFA.
The single lag-order was chosen using the AIC and BIC. SCH refers to the overall Schindler index.
SCHj refers to the Schindler sub indexes j, where IN , OUT , EQ, and CI denote, respectively,
average restrictions on capital inflows, outflows, equities, and collective investments. KLEIN is
an index for the intensity of Klein [71]’s episodic capital controls. CHITO refers to the Chinn-Ito
index of financial liberalization [24]. Robust HAC standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure 1.2: Error correction speed as a function of capital controls intensity
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Note: This figure shows the speed of adjustment as a function of the level of capital controls
(✓1+✓2SCHit). The estimated coe cients and standard errors correspond to specification (1) from
Table 1.6.
although the point estimate for controls on equity transactions is somewhat larger
than for the average index and for collective investments.
Zooming into further detail, Tables A.1 and A.2 report ECM estimates using
even finer instrument subcategories for capital inflows and outflows, respectively. In
general terms, the results imply substantially di↵erent adjustment speeds depending
on the type of restriction imposed. For instance, there is no evidence that restricting
cross-border bond transactions has a statistically significant impact on the speed of
adjustment.14 The results are further nuanced within instrument categories: restric-
14Estimates considering controls on inward and outward direct investment, as well as for financial
credits (not reported) are similarly insignificant. Full results are available upon request.
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Figure 1.3: Adjustment Dynamics
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Note: The adjustment dynamics correspond to specification (1) from Table 1.6. The arrows show
the direction of motion. The left panel was calculated setting capital control intensity to zero
(SCH = 0). The right panel considers the case with capital controls set to the highest intensity
(SCH = 1).
tions on selling or issuing equities abroad appear e↵ective (Table A.1, column (3))
but restrictions on the local purchase of equities by non-residents do not (Table A.1,
column (2)). Inflow restrictions on collective investments, on the other hand, appear
to be unambiguously e↵ective, as are outflow restrictions on equity transactions.
As Klein [71] argues, it is potentially important to distinguish between permanent
and episodic capital controls. This is because domestic financial institutions with
experience in international financial markets may find it easier to evade short-term
restrictions and taxes on capital flows, rendering episodic capital controls less e↵ective
than long-term ones. Thus, as an additional robustness exercise, I consider the
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impact of episodic capital controls as defined by Klein.15 Specifically, I use an index
of the average intensity of episodic controls, KLEIN . This index is simply an
episodic counterpart of SCH that, in line with Klein’s work, excludes permanent
restrictions on capital flows. The key takeaway from this robustness exercise is that
episodic capital controls also appear to slow the speed of adjustment, as indicated
by the positive and significant coe cients on the interaction term. Moreover, the
point estimate for the KLEIN interaction term is substantially larger than for any
other measure of capital controls. This suggests that temporary capital controls are
not only an e↵ective means of slowing REER adjustment, but may also be more
e↵ective than their permanent counterparts.
This result, however, should be interpreted with care. First, the large adjustment
slowdown observed with episodic controls may arise because these are often imposed
in conjunction with other policy measures designed to lean against the wind. In other
words, the estimated impact of temporary controls may be picking up the e↵ects of
other complementary policy interventions. Second, as discussed above, it is highly
likely that controls may lose their e cacy over time as financial markets learn how
to evade them and exploit legal loopholes. Therefore, the larger point estimate for
the KLEIN interaction term may reflect the possibility that the controls in question
have not remained in place long enough to lose their e cacy.
As a final robustness exercise, column (7) of Table 1.6 reports results using
Chinn and Ito [24]’s index of international financial liberalization. Unlike SCH
15The episode dates and instruments covered were taken from Table A.1 in Klein [71].
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Table 1.7: Estimated Half-Lives (years) from Error-Correction Model
SCH SCHIN SCHOUT SCHEQ SCHCI KLEIN CHITO
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
No Controls 2.036 2.163 2.037 1.943 2.065 2.378 2.144
Average Controls 2.318 2.443 2.254 2.267 2.354 2.992 2.728
Full Controls 3.323 3.418 2.946 3.536 3.392 6.629 3.475
Note: This table reports the number of years it takes the real exchange rate to eliminate half of its
disequilibrium from its long-run equilibrium level. The half-lives correspond to the specifications
in columns (1) through (7) in Table 1.6. In the case of the Schindler indexes and Klein’s episodic
index, the half-lives are calculated evaluating the capital controls at zero (no capital controls), the
sample average for each control measure (average controls), and at one (full controls). For the
Chinn-Ito index of capital account liberalization, the half-lives are calculated setting CHITO=2.4
(complete liberalization), CHITO=0.1 (sample average), and CHITO=-1.9 (completely closed).
and KLEIN , CHITO ranges from -1.86 (most closed) to 2.44 (most liberalized).
As such, a negative coe cient on the interaction term would now constitute evidence
in favor of the hypothesis that less open capital accounts slow the adjustment speed
of the real exchange rate.16 As expected, the coe cient on the interaction term is
negative and statistically significant. Moreover, these estimates are remarkably sim-
ilar to the benchmark results: the error-correction speed when CHITO is set to its
minimum is roughly -0.18. Similarly, the estimates imply a speed of adjustment of
-0.28 in a fully liberalized country.
These estimates imply significant heterogeneity in the speed of adjustment across
both countries and time. To illustrate these di↵erences in speed, Table 1.7 reports
the estimated half-lives for the persistence of disequilibria. The real exchange rate
converges to its equilibrium level at a very high speed in countries with relatively
16CHITO has the advantage that it covers more countries and years than the SCH data.
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Table 1.8: Correlation between capital controls and floating exchange rate regimes
Capital Control Measure j: Overall Inflows Outflows Equity Bonds Collective Inv.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FLOAT -0.070 -0.070 -0.066 -0.058 -0.104 -0.124
Note: Reports the correlation coe cient between various measures of capital controls and a dummy
variable for the presence of a floating exchange rate regime. See Appendix A.3 for details on the
construction of the exchange rate regime variables.
low control intensities. For instance, in the baseline estimate it only takes 2 years
for half of a deviation to be eliminated in countries with no controls. On the other
hand, the half-life is as high as 3.3 years with a full set of controls and 3.5 years in
countries with strict controls on equity transactions. The di↵erences are even starker
when episodic controls are imposed: the half-life for countries with strict episodic
controls is nearly 7 years.
1.5 Robustness Checks
This section reports the results from a series of robustness exercises. First, I con-
sider the impact of a potentially important omitted variable that may also influence
the speed of adjustment of the real exchange rate and that is correlated with capital
account policies: the exchange rate regime. Second, I examine if the benchmark
results are robust to the inclusion of additional forms of heterogeneity in the error-
correction mechanism. In particular, I consider an extended specification that allows
the error-correction speed to vary according to various country grouping schemes.
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There are two main reasons why the exchange rate regime may matter when iden-
tifying the e↵ect of capital controls on real exchange rate adjustment dynamics. First,
managed regimes by definition are intended to dampen exchange rate fluctuations
or to target specific levels of the exchange rate. For example, under a pegged regime
all adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium must take place through changes in
relative price-levels, which may be sluggish due to nominal rigidities. Second, man-
aged regimes are often implemented in conjunction with capital controls (see Table
1.8). If having a managed exchange rate slows the speed of adjustment, then a naive
model that fails to take into account the exchange rate regime will tend to overstate
the true e↵ect of capital controls.
To examine this potential channel, I rely on de facto exchange rate regime data
constructed by Ilzetzki et al. [60]. This index classifies exchange rate regimes by
increasing degrees of flexibility, ranging from hard pegs and the absence of a national
currency on one end of the spectrum, to freely floating on the other end. I use this
data to construct a dummy variable FLOATi,t that takes on a value of one if country
i has a floating regime during year t and zero otherwise. Details on the classification
scheme and construction of this variable are provided in Appendix A.3.
The extended ECM incorporating the exchange rate regime is given by:
 REERi,t = ⇥i,teˆi,t 1 + ⇢1SCHi,t 1 + ⇢2SCHi,t 1 · FLOATi,t + ↵ xi,t +  zi,t + ui,t
(1.5)
where
⇥i,t = ✓0 + ✓1SCHi,t 1 + ✓2FLOATi,t + ✓3SCHi,t 1 · FLOATi,t (1.6)
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Table 1.9: Extended Error Correction Models – Exchange Rate Regime Heterogene-
ity
Dependent Variable:  REER
Control Measure j: Overall Inflows Outflows Equity Bonds Col. Inv.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
eˆi,t 1 -0.232*** -0.218*** -0.234*** -0.213*** -0.279*** -0.242***
(0.036) (0.038) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.034)
eˆi,t 1 · SCHj 0.153** 0.136* 0.138** 0.119* 0.174** 0.166***
(0.066) (0.071) (0.059) (0.065) (0.070) (0.061)
SCHj 0.033 0.040 0.027 0.040 0.046 0.038
(0.034) (0.036) (0.030) (0.032) (0.037) (0.028)
eˆi,t 1 · FLOAT -0.041 -0.035 -0.049** -0.049** -0.037 -0.032
(0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.023)
eˆi,t 1 · FLOAT · SCHj -0.052 -0.069 -0.036 -0.069 -0.103 -0.045
(0.084) (0.094) (0.074) (0.088) (0.078) (0.082)
FLOAT · SCHj -0.061 -0.066 -0.056 -0.084* -0.077* -0.053
(0.046) (0.052) (0.038) (0.045) (0.045) (0.043)
Observations 519 519 519 519 453 519
R-squared 0.334 0.325 0.340 0.333 0.387 0.333
RMSE 0.0417 0.0420 0.0415 0.0417 0.0404 0.0417
Hansen J Stat (p) 0.818 0.898 0.767 0.887 0.135 0.838
Note: Each ECM is estimated with two-step GMM using the residuals from the DOLS regression
in Table 1.5. All specifications include contemporaneous and lagged di↵erences of the long-run
variables LNY and NFA. The single lag-order was chosen using the AIC and BIC. FLOAT refers
to a dummy variable for floating exchange rate regimes based on data from Ilzetzki et al. [60].
Robust HAC standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The main di↵erence between this specification and the benchmark specification (1.2)
is the inclusion of extra interaction terms between the exchange rate regime dummy
and the lagged residuals eˆi,t 1, as well as the intensity of capital controls SCHi,t.
The coe cient ✓2 in (1.6) measures the di↵erence in adjustment speeds between
fixed and floating exchange rate regimes. Thus, a negative and significant ✓2 would
indicate that real exchange rate disequilibria are corrected more quickly under float-
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ing regimes. Note that this specification also tests for the presence of short-run e↵ects
of capital controls on the real exchange rate and for whether these short-run e↵ects
di↵er across exchange rate regimes. These are captured, respectively, by coe cients
⇢1 and ⇢2.
Results for the extended ECM model are reported in Table 1.9 for the overall
Schindler index, as well as for various subindexes: controls on inflows, outflows, eq-
uities, bonds, and collective investments. The first thing to note is that these results
are qualitatively and quantitatively quite similar to the benchmark results reported
above. As above, the interaction term between SCHj and eˆi,t 1 is positive and re-
mains statistically significant after controlling for the exchange rate regime. This
suggests that the slower adjustment speed associated with higher capital controls
is not driven by the exchange rate regime. Second, these results do not provide
clear evidence that the exchange rate regime a↵ects real exchange rate adjustment
dynamics. While the point estimates for ✓2 are consistently negative, these are not
significant at standard confidence levels in all but two specifications.
As a final robustness exercise, I also examine the potential impact of various
forms of country-group heterogeneity in real exchange rate adjustment dynamics.
Specifically, I allow the adjustment speed to vary according a country’s monetary
environment and regime, as well as a country’s level of development. To this end, I
estimate the following augmented error-correction model:
 REERi,t = ⇥i,teˆi,t 1 + ⇢1SCHi,t 1 + ⇢2SCHi,t 1 ·Gji + ↵ xi,t +  zi,t + ui,t (1.7)
where
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⇥i,t = ✓0 + ✓1SCHi,t 1 + ✓2G
j
i + ✓3SCHi,t 1 ·Gji (1.8)
The term Gji is a generic dummy variable indicating country membership in a group
classification scheme j. To account for the potential influence of monetary factors,
the set j includes dummies for countries with unusually high average inflation during
the sample, defined as an average inflation rate exceeding the 95th percentile. It
also includes an indicator for countries with inflation targeting regimes. Details
on the list of countries with inflation targeting regimes are presented in Appendix
A.4. To capture the level of development, I consider three alternative classifications:
the World Bank’s definition of “high income” and “industrial” countries, as well as
OECD membership.
Table 1.10 reports the results of the group heterogeneity ECMs. As above, these
results are qualitatively quite similar to the benchmark results in the previous sec-
tion. The interaction term between the extent of disequilibria and the intensity of
capital controls is positive and significant in all five specifications, indicating that
the inclusion of additional forms of heterogeneity in the error-correction model does
not cast doubt on the benchmark results.
These results also do not provide evidence that real exchange rate adjustment
dynamics di↵er substantially across developed and developing countries or between
inflation targeting and non-targeting countries, as evidenced by the insignificant
coe cients on the interaction term eˆi,t 1 · Gj in specifications (2) through (5). The
only exception is the distinction between high and low inflation countries (column 1 of
Table 1.10). Indeed, the results suggest that the error-correction term is statistically
indistinguishable from zero in high inflation countries.
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Table 1.10: Extended Error Correction Models – Country Group Heterogeneity
Dependent Variable:  REER
Country Group Gj : High Inflation Inflation Target High Income OECD Industrial
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
eˆi,t 1 -0.293*** -0.288*** -0.382*** -0.333*** -0.275***
(0.040) (0.043) (0.075) (0.063) (0.052)
eˆi,t 1 · SCH 0.215*** 0.213*** 0.279*** 0.236** 0.163**
(0.068) (0.070) (0.107) (0.093) (0.083)
SCH 0.038 0.041 0.106* 0.075* 0.027
(0.032) (0.032) (0.059) (0.039) (0.042)
eˆi,t 1 ·Gj 0.245* 0.034 0.122 0.017 -0.020
(0.147) (0.038) (0.078) (0.075) (0.065)
eˆi,t 1 ·Gj · SCH -0.518 -0.424* -0.053 -0.035 -0.314
(0.357) (0.250) (0.171) (0.204) (0.201)
Gj · SCH -0.269* -0.176* -0.086 -0.142** -0.123*
(0.147) (0.092) (0.074) (0.065) (0.075)
Observations 694 694 694 694 694
R-squared 0.354 0.362 0.357 0.364 0.352
RMSE 0.054 0.053 0.054 0.053 0.054
Hansen J Stat (p) 0.967 0.950 0.823 0.889 0.998
Note: Each ECM is estimated with two-step GMM using the residuals from the DOLS regression
in Table 1.5. All specifications include contemporaneous and lagged di↵erences of the long-run
variables LNY and NFA. The single lag-order was chosen using the AIC and BIC. Robust HAC
standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
1.6 Concluding Remarks
This paper has examined the relationship between capital controls and the real
exchange rate. The consensus among empirical studies on the e↵ects of capital con-
trols is that these enable domestic authorities to maintain an independent monetary
policy and shield countries from short-term, speculative flows. The evidence is far
less conclusive when it comes to limiting the overall volume of flows and influencing
the real exchange rate. Previous studies, however, have largely overlooked the long-
run determinants of the real exchange rate and are therefore misspecified. Taking the
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determinants of the real exchange rate seriously, it was shown that capital controls
may have very dramatic e↵ects on real exchange rate dynamics, especially if controls
are su ciently strict. Specifically, controls appear to enable real undervaluations
or overvaluations to persist for significantly longer periods compared to countries
without controls.
Future work should examine the role of error-correction non-linearities and in
particular potential di↵erences between the speed of adjustment of overvaluations
and undervaluations. Moreover, these non-linearities may also be compounded by
di↵erent types of capital controls. For instance, controls on inflows may slow the
correction of undervaluations but increase the speed of adjustment when the real
exchange rate is overvalued. Conversely, tighter controls on outflows may cause un-
dervaluations to be eliminated more quickly while allowing overvaluations to persist
for longer or become more severe.
The broader lesson to take from this study is that capital controls are an e↵ective
policy tool for managing the real exchange rate. In other words, controls can help
achieve policy objectives in addition to the macro-prudential concerns stressed by
the recent literature. In particular, capital controls can be of use to countries seek-
ing to deliberatively maintain a real exchange rate undervaluation. Nevertheless,
strictly speaking, the empirical results presented above to do not explain how an
undervaluation is initially achieved but rather suggest that the real exchange rate,
once already undervalued, will take longer to converge to its long-run level. How the
undervaluation is originally achieved and how this a↵ects the short-run dynamics of
the real exchange rate requires further research.
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CHAPTER 2
LEAKY CAPITAL CONTROLS IN THE PRESENCE OF
SAVVY FINANCIAL MARKETS
2.1 Introduction
The last several years have witnessed a renewed use of capital controls in emerg-
ing markets in response to volatile capital flows and financial crises. For example,
prudential restrictions on capital inflows were imposed in Brazil during the aftermath
of the global financial crisis in order to stem excessive exchange rate appreciation and
systemic risk.1 Similarly, countries like Iceland, Greece, and Cyprus have imposed
extensive controls on capital outflows to limit the fallout from domestic banking
crises. This “hands on” approach to capital flow management has been accompa-
nied by an active academic literature investigating the theoretical welfare rationale
for imposing capital controls in a variety of circumstances, including the existence of
borrowing constraints (e.g. Jeanne and Korinek [65], Bianchi [13]), learning-by-doing
externalities (e.g. Korinek [73], Michaud and Rothert [89]), and nominal rigidities
(e.g. Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe [114], Farhi and Werning [40]).2
1See, Ostry et al. [95] for an account of Brazil’s experience.
2A detailed review is provided by Engel [36].
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Although this recent theoretical literature has improved our understanding of
the welfare e↵ects of capital controls, it has largely ignored issues related to their
implementation and enforcement. Models typically assume that capital controls are
perfectly enforceable and that the imagined social planners or financial regulators
are able to e↵ortlessly correct any existing externalities by setting a tax on capital
flows at its optimal level. This idealized benchmark is helpful for clarifying theo-
retical mechanisms but could be misleading from a policymaking perspective where
policies are, in general, imperfectly binding and political economy concerns are im-
portant; especially in emerging market settings where limited institutional capacities
are the norm. Moreover, because capital control policies deliberately aim to segment
international and domestic financial markets, these necessarily create an incentive
for evasion by financial actors seeking to profit from arbitrage opportunities.
Indeed, it is widely understood that maintaining e↵ective capital controls requires
the ability to identify and close regulatory loopholes and to monitor illicit activity
by investors attempting to bypass regulation (see, e.g. Ostry et al. [95]). The busi-
ness and financial press is not lacking in accounts of investors creatively exploiting
regulatory loopholes or devising other illicit means through which to bypass restric-
tions on capital mobility. As Figure 2.1 illustrates, this was a particular concern in
Brazil between 2009-2012, for example, where authorities had to constantly tweak
their “IOF” tax on capital inflows in order to close loopholes and make it harder for
investors to get away with unauthorized flows.3 Similarly, authorities in Iceland have
3Closing regulatory loopholes has also recently been a concern for the implementation of China’s
controls on capital outflows. For example, in November, 2016, a Bloomberg News article reported
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Figure 2.1: Timeline of Brazil’s IOF Tax – Daily cumulative policy adjustments
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Note: This figure is based on data from the IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and
Restrictions (AREAR) database. Cumulative adjustments refers to the total number of changes in
capital controls policies since January 2009.
credited their success with capital controls during the aftermath of the 2009 collapse
with reforms that eliminated loopholes.4
This paper explores the implication of imperfect enforcement of capital controls
and regulatory evasion by the financial sector in the setting of a small open economy
with a “Dutch disease” externality arising from excessive capital inflows. In the
models presented below, the enforcement and implementation of capital controls arise
endogenously as the outcome of non-cooperative strategic behavior of a domestic
that “China’s policy makers are playing catch-up as investors get more creative in evading capital
controls.” [51]
4See, OECD [93].
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regulatory authority and the financial sector. The regulatory authority is assumed
to have a limited administrative capacity to implement capital controls in the face
of a banking sector actively attempting to bypass their enforcement. This setup is
used to study the welfare rationale for capital controls and how varying forms of
imperfect enforcement impact a planner’s ability to correct externalities associated
with capital inflows.
The results are as follows. First, optimally chosen capital controls improve welfare
relative to the “laissez-faire” benchmark with no capital controls, even with imperfect
enforcement and active evasion by financial markets. Second, when evasion is costly
and the probability of avoiding detection by the regulator is a↵ected by the evasion
choices of financial actors, capital controls will have more traction and can drive
a greater wedge between domestic and international financial markets. However,
this implies that the economy’s “first-best” outcome can no longer be achieved as
a decentralized equilibrium using capital controls. This is because bank evasion
activity represents a pure waste from a societal perspective and can be thought of
as a type of deadweight loss. Finally, we demonstrate the possibility of a “perverse”
case where easier evasion could actually be beneficial from a social perspective if the
distortions arising from illicitly avoiding the capital controls are large.
The problem of imperfect enforcement and regulatory evasion has long been rec-
ognized by the empirical literature and policy-oriented studies on the e↵ectiveness of
capital controls. Indeed, evasion is often cited as an explanation for why capital con-
trols may be ine↵ective in practice despite theoretical arguments in their favor (see,
e.g. Forbes et al. [45]). In a similar vein, Habermeier et al. [56] note that di↵erences
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in policymakers’ administrative capacities may be linked to the poor implementa-
tion of controls and could explain cross-country di↵erences in their e↵ectiveness. A
constrained regulatory authority may also find it di cult to properly detect finan-
cial actors attempting to avoid the regulation. For example, in the Chilean context
during the 1990s, Edwards [32] suggests that Chile’s capital controls may have been
ine↵ective because of the government’s inability to adequately monitor evasion. Con-
cerns about evasion in Chile were also raised by Forbes [47], who suggests that large
firms may have been well poised to exploit legal loopholes and bypass the controls
on capital inflows.
Di↵erences in the characteristics and development of the domestic financial sec-
tor may also impact the ability of a regulatory authority to enforce capital controls.
Intuitively, all else equal, complex financial sectors may be harder to adequately mon-
itor than simpler ones. For example, Garber [52] argues that derivatives contracts
could be devised to evade restrictions that target short-term inflows by e↵ectively
disguising short-term borrowing as long-term debt. Ostry et al. [95] point out that
foreign investors can also use derivatives to avoid paying taxes on domestic assets.
Similarly, Klein [71] argues that more developed financial systems with experience
in financial markets may be better at finding loopholes or other ways around capital
controls.
And yet, despite the clear potential for evasion or poor implementation of capital
control policies, it is not obvious a priori that imperfectly enforced capital controls
should prove ine↵ective. So long as evasion is costly or enforcement is at least
partially binding, capital controls could still succeed in segmenting the domestic
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and international financial markets. This point is made by Levy-Yeyati et al. [81],
who show using an event-study methodology that the “cross market premium” –
the di↵erence in price of identical stocks trading in two separate markets – increases
when capital controls are imposed. This suggests that even if some investors succeed
in avoiding the controls, on average controls can still be binding.
The closest to the current paper is Bianchi [10], who study a model of endogenous
sudden stops with “leaky” capital controls. In their model, capital flows impose pecu-
niary externalities through their e↵ect on the value of collateral and an occasionally
binding borrowing constraint. Capital controls may improve welfare by encouraging
precautionary savings but are assumed to be imperfectly enforceable, as in this pa-
per. The key di↵erence is that their model assumes that a fraction of agents in the
economy are “unregulated” and can perfectly evade the capital controls. In contrast,
in this paper evasion of the capital controls arises endogenously from the strategic
interaction of banks and a domestic regulatory authority.
Another closely related work is Schulze [115], which provides two alternative
models of capital control evasion through import and export misreporting. How-
ever, in contrast to the models presented below, Schulze’s models focus exclusively
on the mechanics of evasion and enforcement, foregoing an explicit welfare anal-
ysis of capital controls. Thus, Bianchi [10] and Schulze [115] can be seen as two
modeling extremes: with exogenous enforcement and explicit welfare analysis at one
extreme, and endogenous enforcement without welfare analysis at the other. The
models presented below combine both aspects and is therefore the first paper in the
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literature to simultaneously study the welfare rationale for imposing capital controls
with endogenously determined enforcement and evasion.
The rest of the paper will proceed as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the basic
framework considered in all the models below by considering the standard case with-
out regulatory evasion by the financial sector. Section 2.3 then considers a model
where the domestic banking sector has access to a variety of loopholes through which
to attempt to evade the capital controls. Section 2.4, in turn, presents a simple ex-
tension of the loophole model that results in the perfect evasion of capital controls by
the financial sector. Next, Section 2.5 examines a more general model where banks
can directly influence the probability of being caught evading the capital controls.
Finally, Section 2.6 o↵ers some concluding remarks.
2.2 Basic Framework
Consider a small open endowment economy with a single tradable good and a
unit measure of identical households. For simplicity, the economy exists for only two
periods. There exists a competitive domestic banking sector that acts as an inter-
mediary between domestic households and the world financial market. Households
borrow during the first period in order to finance consumption and repay their debt
during the second period.
In order to motivate the use of capital controls, the economy features a stylized
“Dutch disease” externality that reduces the size of the endowment during the second
period proportionately to the level of aggregate capital inflows. This welfare rationale
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for imposing capital controls is similar in spirit to those considered in Korinek [73]
and can be thought of as a type of “learning-by-exporting” externality.
Households make consumption and borrowing decisions over both periods in order
to maximize the following utility function
u(c1, c2) = ln(c1) + c2 (2.1)
subject to the two period budget constraints,
c1 = d (2.2)
c2 = y   (1 + r)d+ ⇡ + ` (2.3)
where d is the level of household debt, y is an endowment of tradable goods, ⇡ are
profits from the financial sector, and ` denotes lump sum transfers. The government
is assumed to run a balanced budget, which implies that in the aggregate the lump
sum transfers will equal the revenues from the capital controls, ` = ⌧d. Although each
individual household takes y as given, in the aggregate the endowment is a decreasing
function of net imports or, equivalently, of capital inflows.5 For simplicity, the second
period endowment takes the following form:
y = y¯   'd (2.4)
5Note that in this model capital inflows and the stock of foreign debt are equal. This is because
of the two-period assumption and the implicit assumption that the initial stock of net foreign
liabilities is zero.
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Each household’s optimal choice of c1 is defined by the first order condition:
1
c1
= 1 + r (2.5)
Banks borrow from the international financial market at the exogenous constant
interest rate r⇤ and lend to households at the domestic rate r. In addition to their
borrowing costs, banks also face a convex portfolio cost to capture administrative
costs internal to the bank. For simplicity, we will assume the portfolio costs are
quadratic. Banks must satisfy a balance sheet constraint requiring that its assets
equal its liabilities: d = d⇤, where d⇤ denotes foreign borrowing. Bank profits are
thus given by:
⇡ = (r   r⇤   ⌧)d  ✓
2
d2 (2.6)
The term ⌧ > 0 denotes a tax on bank borrowing and therefore represent a positive
tax on capital inflows. The first order condition for the bank’s optimization problem
yields the lending inverse supply schedule:
r = r⇤ + ⌧ + ✓d (2.7)
Notice that there is a wedge between the domestic and international interest rates.
This wedge is composed of two components, (1) the tax on capital inflows, ⌧ , and
(2) the marginal portfolio cost.
We can now proceed to characterizing the model’s decentralized equilibrium.
Definition 1 (Decentralized equilibrium) A decentralized equilibrium consists
of a domestic interest rate, r, and allocations {c1, c2, d, d⇤} for t = 1, 2, such that:
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• The equilibrium allocations solve the representative household’s optimization
problem taking the domestic interest rate as given.
• Banks maximize profits taking the domestic and international interest rates as
given.
• The loan market clears.
To solve for the equilibrium level of first period consumption (which is equal to net
capital inflows), combine (2.5) and (2.7) to obtain:
1
d
= 1 + r⇤ + ⌧ + ✓d (2.8)
which implicitly defines the equilibrium capital inflows as a decreasing function of
the inflow tax. That is, equilibrium capital inflows are given by d = d(⌧) and satisfy
d0(⌧) < 0.
The decentralized equilibrium is clearly not Pareto optimal since individual house-
holds do not take into account their contribution to the Dutch disease externality
when making their first period borrowing decision. Because households take the sec-
ond period endowment as given, aggregate capital inflows will be ine ciently large.
Put di↵erently, this economy su↵ers from “overborrowing” in equilibrium or “exces-
sive” capital inflows. To find the e cient level of capital inflows, we can set up the
following social planner problem:
max
d
u = ln(d) + y¯   (1 + r⇤ + ')d  ✓
2
d2 (2.9)
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The social planner’s optimal choice of capital inflows, dsp, is thus defined by:
1
dsp
= 1 + r⇤ + '+ ✓dsp (2.10)
Comparing conditions (2.8) and (2.10), it is evident that the social planner equilib-
rium can be achieved by setting the tax on capital inflows at ⌧ = ' and rebating the
revenue back to households in lump-sum fashion.
Definition 2 (First-best equilibrium) The economy’s first-best equilibrium is the
outcome achieved by the unconstrained social planner, with equilibrium capital inflows
satisfying (2.10).
Definition 3 (Laissez-faire equilibrium) The economy’s Laissez-faire equilibrium
is the decentralized equilibrium with no capital controls (⌧ = 0).
The model up to this point is standard and assumes that capital controls are
perfectly enforceable. As such, the socially optimal equilibrium can be achieved
simply by setting the inflow tax at its optimal level. In the next section we’ll start to
relax this assumption by considering an extension of the basic model with imperfect
capital control enforcement due to regulatory loopholes.
2.3 A Model With Loopholes
To capture the idea that banks can exploit a variety of loopholes to avoid capital
controls, suppose that banks have access to J 2 N borrowing strategies. Another
way to interpret this is that banks can borrow from international financial markets
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using J distinct classes of financial instruments. To focus exclusively on the issue of
regulation, suppose that each instrument j 2 J charges the same constant interest
rate r⇤. Thus, the only reason banks may prefer one instrument j over another is
in order to evade the capital controls. The domestic regulator in charge of enforcing
the capital controls is institutionally constrained in the sense that it has a limited
capacity to monitor bank borrowing behavior. In particular, the regulator is assumed
to only be able to monitor one of the J instrument categories at a time. Banks are
aware of this enforcement constraint and attempt to avoid the capital controls by
choosing an instrument not being monitored by the regulator.
Formally, consider a simultaneous move game in which the bank (player B)
chooses an instrument to borrow with and the regulator (player R) chooses which
instrument to monitor. With J distinct instruments, the sets of actions available for
players i = {B,R} are Ai = {1, 2, . . . , J}, where each individual action for player i
is denoted by ai. Let v(aB, aR) denote the bank’s payo↵s given actions aB and aR.
The regulator’s payo↵s, similarly, are given by m(aB, aR). The bank attempts to
avoid paying the tax on capital inflows and loses  ⌧ per unit of borrowing if it is
“caught” by the regulator. Conversely, if the regulator successfully catches the bank
attempting to evade the capital controls it gains ⌧ per unit of borrowing. Therefore,
the bank’s payo↵s are v(aB, aR) =  ⌧ if aB = aR and v(aB, aR) = 0 if aB 6= aR.
Similarly, the regulator’s payo↵s are m(aB, aR) = ⌧ if aB = aR and m(aB, aR) = 0 if
aB 6= aR. This information is summarized below.
Loophole Game. The capital control loophole game consists of:
• Players: the “bank” (B) and the “regulator” (R).
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Figure 2.2: Enforcement game with two instruments (J = 2)
Bank
Regulator
1 2
1  ⌧ , ⌧ 0 , 0
2 0 , 0  ⌧ , ⌧
• Actions: instrument borrowing and monitoring choices Ai = {1, 2, . . . , J} for
i = {B,R}.
• Payo↵s: player B’s payo↵s are
v(aB, aR) =
8>><>>:
 ⌧ 8 aB = aR
0 8 aB 6= aR
and player R’s payo↵s are
m(aB, aR) =
8>><>>:
⌧ 8 aB = aR
0 8 aB 6= aR
This game has the structure of a classic matching pennies game and, as such, has
no pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Instead, both players randomize and play mixed
strategies in equilibrium, playing each action with an equal probability. Therefore,
the probability that the bank will be “caught” evading the capital controls and will
have to pay the inflow tax is:
p =
1
J
(2.11)
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Notice that the bank’s lending and borrowing problem is no longer deterministic
since the expected tax on capital inflows is now a random variable. Using (2.11),
expected profits are given by:
E{⇡} =
⇣
r   r⇤   ⌧
J
⌘
d  ✓
2
d2 (2.12)
For simplicity, banks are assumed to bear all the risk associated with evading the
capital controls. The bank’s first order condition requires banks to equate marginal
cost of foreign borrowing to the the domestic interest rate:
r = r⇤ +
⌧
J
+ ✓d (2.13)
Using the household’s Euler equation and the result from (2.13), the equilibrium
capital inflows when capital controls are imperfectly binding is defined by:
1
d
= 1 + r⇤ +
⌧
J
+ ✓d (2.14)
Therefore, as before, capital inflows are decreasing in the tax rate and increasing in
the available loopholes. In order to distinguish this equilibrium from the first one
considered above without evasion, the evasion equilibrium will be denoted with a
“tilde.” That is, d˜ = d˜(⌧, J), with d˜⌧ < 0 and d˜J > 0.
2.3.1 Regulatory Equilibria
We can consider two alternative solution concepts for the regulatory game. First,
consider the case of a naive planner that sets the capital inflow tax without antici-
50
pating evasion by the financial sector. Intuitively, the planner in this setup does not
realize it is playing a game in the first stage of the model and simply chooses the
tax rate ⌧ without taking the bank’s strategic behavior into account. As a result,
the e↵ective inflow tax will generally di↵er from the optimal tax. Second, the naive
planner can be contrasted with a sophisticated planner who anticipates the bank’s
evasion behavior. The sophisticated planner is the first mover in a sequential game
and thus chooses the inflow tax taking into account that the capital controls are
imperfectly binding. These two planner concepts are summarized below.
Definition 4 (Naive planner) The naive planner does not take the bank’s evasion
into account and chooses an inflow tax ⌧np in order to maximize perceived social
welfare.
Definition 5 (Sophisticated planner) The sophisticated planner anticipates bank
evasion and chooses an inflow tax ⌧sp in order to maximize the true social welfare
function subject to the bank’s best response function.
Let’s start with the naive planner case. Since the naive planner does not antici-
pate the bank’s evasion, it believes that equilibrium capital inflows are d(·) instead
of d˜(·). The naive planner’s problem consists of choosing ⌧ in order to maximize the
naive social welfare function:
max
⌧
u(⌧) = ln(d(⌧)) + y¯   (1 + r⇤ + ')d(⌧)  ✓
2
(d(⌧))2 (2.15)
As in the non-strategic case, the naive social welfare function is maximized at ⌧np = ',
where the subscript n indicates that this is the inflow tax chosen by the naive planner.
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However, since the naive planner incorrectly believes that equilibrium capital inflows
are given by d(·) instead of d˜(·), this is the wrong objective function and therefore
⌧np will not maximize social welfare.
To see this, let’s examine the sophisticated planner’s problem. The sophisticated
planner anticipates the bank’s evasion and recognizes that equilibrium capital con-
trols are given by d˜(⌧, J) rather than d(⌧). In other words, the sophisticated planner
maximizes the “true” social welfare function:
max
⌧
u˜(⌧) = ln(d˜(⌧, J)) + y¯   (1 + r⇤ + ')d˜(⌧, J)  ✓
2
(d˜(⌧, J))2 (2.16)
The inflow tax that maximizes social welfare is given by ⌧s = J'. This can be shown
as follows. The sophisticated planner’s first order condition for ⌧ is
d˜⌧

1
d˜
  (1 + r⇤ + '+ ✓d˜)
 
= 0 (2.17)
Recall that loan market equilibrium requires (2.14) to hold. We can rewrite the first
order condition as:
d˜⌧
h ⌧
J
  '
i
= 0 (2.18)
which is clearly satisfied when ⌧ = J'. Therefore, we can conclude that the sophis-
ticated planner sets a larger de jure inflow tax than the naive planner.
A couple of observations are in order. First, the naive planner, by failing to
anticipate the bank’s evasion behavior, will set an inflow tax that is ine ciently low
compared to the tax chosen by the sophisticated planner (⌧np < ⌧sp). In general, the
greater the number of loopholes (or alternatively, financial instrument categories),
52
the larger this discrepancy becomes. Examining equation (2.11), it is evident that
in the limit as the number of loopholes become arbitrarily large the naive planner’s
inflow tax becomes totally ine↵ective (since limJ!1+ p⌧ = 0). In other words, as
evasion becomes arbitrarily easy, the capital controls are no longer binding and the
equilibrium reduces to the laissez-faire case with no capital controls (i.e. ⌧ = 0).
A second and important point, however, is that for a finite J , the naive inflow
tax nevertheless improves welfare relative to the laissez-faire case with no capital
controls. Specifically, the following inequality holds:
u˜(0) < u˜(⌧np) < u˜(⌧sp) (2.19)
Intuitively, this means that even if capital controls are imperfectly binding, they
nevertheless improve welfare relative to the laissez-faire equilibrium with no capital
controls. This point is illustrated in Figure 2.3, which depicts the sophisticated
planner’s social welfare function in black and the naive planner’s perceived welfare
function in blue. Social welfare is maximized at point SP , which can be implemented
by setting an inflow tax ⌧sp = J'.
2.4 A Model With Perfect Evasion
A natural robustness exercise is to consider a modified loophole game where
the regulator chooses which loophole to monitor before the bank makes its evasion
decisions. In other words, let’s consider a sequential move version of the loophole
game from the previous section. The players in this game are still the regulator (R)
and the bank (B). Unless noted otherwise, we will use the same notation as for the
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Figure 2.3: Social welfare function under various equilibria (u˜(⌧))
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Note: This figure depicts the sophisticated planner’s social welfare function (in black) and the
naive planner’s perceived welfare function (in blue). The points SP and NP refer, respectively,
to the sophisticated planner and naive planner solutions.
simple loophole game. Player B still attempts to choose a di↵erent loophole from
the one being monitored by player R and if both choose the same loophole, we say
that the bank has been “caught” attempting to evade the capital controls.
Figure 2.4 illustrates the structure and timing of the sequential loophole game in
the case with two available loopholes (J = 2). The timing of the game is as follows.
During the first stage, the regulator chooses which loophole to monitor. During stage
two, the bank observes which loophole is being monitored and then decides whether
to attempt to “evade” the capital controls or to “comply” and pay the inflow tax.
We will assume evasion is costly and that the bank must pay a unit cost of   > 0 if
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Figure 2.4: Sequential loophole game with two loopholes (J = 2)
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Note: This figure shows the extensive form game tree for the sequential loophole game with two
loopholes (J = 2). The bank and the regulator, respectively, are shown as players B and R. Player
B’s payo↵s are shown on the top row of each payo↵ matrix. All payo↵s are normalized for a unit
of bank borrowing (d⇤ = 1).
it chooses to evade the capital controls. During the third and final stage, the bank
chooses which loophole to use to borrow from the international financial market.
Proceeding by backwards induction, clearly the bank’s best response during the
third stage is to choose aB 6= aR whenever ⌧ > 0. In the second stage, the bank
compares the unit costs of evading or complying with the capital controls and chooses
to evade whenever the inflow tax is greater than the unit cost of evasion (⌧ >  ).
Thus, the bank can perfectly evade the capital controls regardless of which loophole
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the regulator chooses to monitor. As a result, the regulator will be indi↵erent between
monitoring strategies during the first stage.
We can now use the game’s equilibrium to solve the bank’s borrowing and lending
optimization problem. The bank’s objective function is the same as above with the
exception that it’s borrowing costs are (r⇤+⌧) whenever ⌧   , and equal to (r⇤+ )
otherwise. As a result, the domestic interest rate will be given by:
r = r⇤ + ✓d+min{⌧,  } (2.20)
As is evident from equation (2.20), the domestic interest rate is increasing in the
inflow tax but only until a certain level. Specifically, capital controls will lose their
traction over the interest rate whenever the inflow tax exceeds the unit cost of evasion
(i.e. ⌧ >  ). The intuition for this result is that, for a low inflow tax, financial
markets do not have an incentive to evade the capital controls. A su ciently high
inflow tax, on the other hand, will trigger evasion by the financial sector. Since
financial markets can perfectly evade the regulator’s monitoring, capital controls
will no longer influence the interest rate once evasion is triggered.
Once again, equilibrium in this model requires the loan market to clear and the
sophisticated planner to choose an inflow tax, ⌧ , to maximize social welfare. Denoting
equilibrium capital inflows by d(⌧), the planner’s problem is:
max
⌧
u(⌧) = ln(d) + y¯   (1 + r⇤ + ')d+ ✓
2
d2    d( ) · {⌧ >  } (2.21)
s.t d = max{d(⌧), d( )}
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Figure 2.5: Social welfare with perfect evasion when ' >  
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Note: This figure compares social welfare as a function of the de jure capital inflow tax for both
the unconstrained social planner (in blue) and the sophisticated planner (in black). The first-
best equilibrium attained by the social planner is given by point FB. The sophisticated planner’s
solution is denoted by point SP .
where {⌧ >  } is the indicator function, which is equal to one when ⌧ >   and zero
otherwise. This optimization problem is almost identical to the one considered in the
previous section with two exceptions. First, equilibrium capital flows as a function
of ⌧ are now bounded below by d( ), the level corresponding to an inflow tax of  .
Second, notice the additional term on the right hand side of (2.21). This term is the
total cost from evading the capital controls when evasion is triggered. Unlike the
bank’s additional borrowing costs associated with the inflow tax, the evasion cost
is not rebated back to consumers and as such represents a pure loss from a societal
perspective.
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There are two cases to consider. First, whenever the Dutch disease externality
is small relative to the unit cost of evasion (' <  ), a planner will be able to
perfectly implement the economy’s first-best equilibrium. This is because the inflow
tax necessary to fully internalize the externality, ⌧ = ', is below the level that
trigger’s financial market evasion. In other words, when the externality is small, the
planner will be able to freely set the inflow tax at its optimal level without having
to worry about financial sector evasion.
The second and more interesting case is when the externality is large relative to
the unit cost of evasion (' >  ). In this case, the planner would like to set ⌧ = '
but knows that this will trigger evasion by financial markets and that any inflow tax
above   is totally ine↵ective at the margins. This case is illustrated in Figure 2.5,
which depicts the planner’s social welfare function in black. As a useful benchmark,
the first-best welfare function without evasion is depicted in blue. Clearly, capital
controls can no longer implement the first-best equilibrium and the planner will
choose ⌧ =  . This is because any inflow tax above   will trigger evasion by the
financial sector and lead to the incurrence of the evasion costs.
Nevertheless, capital controls will still improve welfare relative to the laissez-faire
case (i.e. u(0)) even with perfect evasion. This is because any inflow tax, 0 < ⌧ 
  < ', delivers higher welfare than u(0). Intuitively, even if financial markets are
perfectly capable of evading the capital controls, these will still be partially binding
as long as evasion is costly. Put di↵erently, while perfect evasion may place a binding
constraint on the planner’s ability to correct large externalities, capital controls can
still internalize a portion of the externality.
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2.4.1 The Cost of Evasion
From a policymaking perspective, an obvious comparative static to consider is
a fall in the unit cost of evasion. The unit cost of evasion may reflect a number of
di↵erent factors in the underlying regulatory and financial structure of the economy.
For example, it may be more expensive for banks to evade the capital controls in
countries with extensive reporting requirements for foreign exchange transactions.
Similarly, evasion may also be costlier in countries with well-trained and well-sta↵ed
regulators responsible for enforcing the capital controls.
While the link between the cost of evasion and the e↵ectiveness of capital controls
at segmenting the domestic and international financial markets is straightforward,
the welfare e↵ects are not obvious and depend crucially on whether we consider a
sophisticated or a naive planner. Let’s consider the sophisticated planner first. We
know from the previous section that the optimal inflow tax is: ⌧sp = min{ ,'}.
Whenever the cost of evasion is large relative to the externality (  > '), a small
decrease in the unit cost of evasion will have no e↵ect on social welfare. This is
because   is still high enough that evasion is not triggered and the economy remains
at the first-best outcome. In contrast, if the unit cost of evasion is small or equal
to the externality, a decrease in   could trigger evasion and constrain the planner’s
ability to set the inflow tax at its optimal level. In this case, the e↵ect of a fall in  
will unambiguously decrease social welfare.
Turning now to the naive planner, the welfare e↵ects of a fall in the unit cost of
evasion will again depend on whether or not evasion is triggered. Just like with the
sophisticated planner, if   is su ciently large relative to the externality, a fall in  
59
will have no e↵ect on welfare. Similarly, if   is small or equal to the externality and
the fall in   triggers evasion, social welfare will be reduced. However, unlike with the
sophisticated planner, if the unit cost of evasion is su ciently small relative to the
externality, a further decrease could paradoxically improve welfare. This is because
the naive planner sets ⌧np = ', which implies an evasion cost of  d('). Since the
equilibrium level of capital inflows is constant, a fall in   simply has the e↵ect of
decreasing the total evasion losses incurred by triggering evasion.
2.5 A Model With Costly Evasion
The loophole game model in Section 2.4 provided an example of a setup where
the equilibrium enforcement probability is a constant determined by the number of
loopholes available to the banking sector. The key result from this framework is that
a sophisticated planner could attain the first-best outcome by setting an inflow tax
appropriately scaled to the number of loopholes. In this section we will consider a
more general model where the bank can directly influence the probability of being
caught by the regulator. In particular, the bank is assumed to be able to divert
resources towards lowering the probability of being caught attempting to avoid the
capital controls.
Formally, let z   0 and   > 0 denote the bank’s evasion activity and the unit
cost of evasion, respectively. Intuitively, when the bank borrows from abroad it can
either lend all of the borrowed tradable goods or divert  z units to attempting to
avoid paying the inflow tax. We will assume that larger “illicit” capital inflows are
harder to hide than smaller inflows. Put di↵erently, this means that the probability of
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being caught is increasing in the level of foreign borrowing but decreasing in evasion
spending. Let’s define the amount of e↵ective evasion per unit of bank borrowing by
 = z/d and denote the probability of being caught evading the capital controls by
p = p(), where p() satisfies p0 < 0, p00 > 0, p(0) = 1, and lim!1 p() = 0. The
bank’s problem is given by:
max
d,z
E{⇡} = (r   r⇤)d  ✓
2
d2   p()⌧d   z (2.22)
The first order conditions for a maximum are given by:
r   r⇤   ✓d  ⌧ (p()  p0()) = 0 (2.23)
 p0()⌧     = 0 (2.24)
Equation (2.24) pins down the optimal choice of e↵ective evasion for a given inflow
tax: ⇤ = (⌧). By the implicit function theorem, we can see that e↵ective evasion
is increasing in the inflow tax:
@
@⌧
=   p
0()
p00()⌧
> 0 (2.25)
The intuition for this result is simple: a higher inflow tax increases the marginal
cost of borrowing and thus creates a greater incentive for evasion. As a result,
the equilibrium probability of being caught will be decreasing in the inflow tax:
p⇤ = p(⌧).
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The household side of this model is the same as the benchmark framework de-
scribed above. As such, equilibrium requires that the domestic loan market clears.
In equilibrium, the domestic interest rate will be pinned down by the first order
condition (2.23). Plugging in p⇤ and ⇤, the domestic interest rate is given by:
r = r⇤ + ✓d+ ⌧g(⌧) (2.26)
where g(⌧) = (p(⌧)  (⌧)p0(⌧)). Note that the domestic interest rate is strictly
increasing in ⌧ . Di↵erentiating (2.26) with respect to ⌧ , we get:
@r
@⌧
= p(⌧)  (⌧)p0(⌧)  ⌧(⌧)@
@⌧
p00(⌧) (2.27)
Using the result from (2.25), this reduces simply to:
@r
@⌧
= p(⌧) (2.28)
The equilibrium level of capital inflows is, in turn, defined implicitly by the familiar
condition:
1
d˜
= 1 + r⇤ + ✓d˜+ ⌧g(⌧) (2.29)
As before, it can be shown that equilibrium capital inflows are a decreasing function
of the inflow tax, d˜(⌧), with d˜0(⌧) < 0.
2.5.1 Evasion Equilibria
Once again, we can contrast the naive and sophisticated planner solutions. The
naive planner does not anticipate the bank’s strategic behavior and sets the inflow
62
tax at ⌧np = '. The sophisticated planner, on the other hand, is the first mover and
chooses the optimal inflow tax subject to the bank’s best response. The sophisticated
planner’s optimization problem is given by:
max
⌧
u(⌧) = ln(d˜(⌧)) + y¯   (1 + r⇤ + ')d˜(⌧)  ✓
2
d˜(⌧)2    (⌧)d˜(⌧) (2.30)
The optimal inflow tax is therefore pinned down by the following first-order condition:
d⌧

1
d
  (1 + r⇤ + ✓ + '+  )
 
   d@
@⌧
= 0 (2.31)
Using the loan market equilibrium condition (2.29), the first-order condition can be
rewritten in a more intuitive form:
p⇤⌧ = '  ⇣(⌧) (2.32)
where ⇣(⌧) ⌘  [1 +  z/ d] and the terms  z and  d, respectively, denote the elas-
ticities of z and d with respect to ⌧ . Expressed in this form, the first-order condition
equates the e↵ective tax on capital inflows to the Dutch disease externality minus
an additional term that represents the distortions introduced by the bank’s evasion
behavior. Condition (2.32) implies that the sophisticated planner will only be able
to set an e↵ective tax that perfectly internalizes the externality in the special case
when there exists a ⌧ > 0 such that ⇣(⌧) = 0.
We can now state an important result from this model: with endogenous and
costly evasion, capital controls can no longer implement the economy’s first-best equi-
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librium. To see this, let’s start by setting up the social planner’s unconstrained
problem of directly choosing {d, z}.
max
d,z
u(d, z) = ln(d) + y¯   (1 + r⇤ + ')d  ✓
2
d2    z (2.33)
The only di↵erence between this problem and the no evasion benchmark case con-
sidered above is the last term   z denoting the cost of evasion. Clearly, a social
planner will choose z = 0 and an optimal d satisfying the first-order condition
1
d
  (1 + r⇤ + '+ ✓d) = 0 (2.34)
To show that this solution cannot be achieved through decentralization we will pro-
ceed by contradiction. Suppose there exists a ⌧ ⇤ > 0 such that d˜(⌧ ⇤) satisfies (2.34).
For ⌧ ⇤ to solve the unconstrained social planner’s problem we must also have:
z = (⌧ ⇤)d˜(⌧ ⇤) = 0 (2.35)
This condition is satisfied for either (⌧ ⇤) = 0 or d˜(⌧ ⇤) = 0. Clearly, d˜(⌧ ⇤) = 0 cannot
be optimal since it implies c1 = 0 and negative infinity utility. Moreover, (⌧ ⇤) = 0
holds when ⌧ ⇤ = 0, but this contradicts our assumption of ⌧ ⇤ > 0. Therefore, we can
conclude that there does not exist a ⌧ ⇤ that implements the first-best equilibrium.
The intuition behind this result is simple: banks incur costs attempting to by-
pass the capital controls and as such decrease the economy’s total supply of tradable
goods. Put di↵erently, active regulatory evasion is non-productive and as such an
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Figure 2.6: Social welfare in the costly evasion model
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Note: This figure compares social welfare as a function of the de jure capital inflow tax for both
the unconstrained social planner (in blue) and the sophisticated planner (in black). The first-best
equilibrium attained by the social planner is given by point FB, while the sophisticated planner’s
solution is at SP . The point NP shows the naive planner’s solution. The laissez-faire benchmark
(LF ) with ⌧ = 0 is shown in red.
unconstrained social planner would set it equal to zero. Nevertheless, profit maxi-
mizing banks will always choose a positive amount of evasion expenditure whenever
capital controls are present. A related implication is that the first-best outcome can
de replicated by the sophisticated planner only in the trivial case with no externali-
ties. Of course, this special case is not very interesting since there’s no rationale to
impose capital controls in the first place and the laissez-faire equilibrium is already
equivalent to the social planner’s.
Costly evasion also raises the possibility of a perverse case where capital controls
set by the naive planner may actually decrease welfare relative to the laissez-faire
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outcome. In other words, a naive planner not taking the bank’s strategic behavior
into account could set capital controls that are ine ciently large. This is because, for
large  , the naive planner’s solution may correspond to evasion losses that outweigh
the gains from curbing capital inflows. This case is illustrated in Figure 2.6, which
compares the sophisticated planner’s welfare function against the unconstrained plan-
ner’s function. The economy’s first-best outcome is obtained at point FB, which is
greater than the maximum welfare attainable by the sophisticated planner, at point
SP . The naive planner incorrectly believes that his objective function is given by the
unconstrained welfare function and therefore sets an inflow tax ⌧np = '. This corre-
sponds to point NP , which in this case lies below the laissez-faire welfare (shown in
red).
2.5.2 The Cost of Evasion
Let’s again consider what happens to social welfare when evasion becomes less
costly for the financial sector. As in the model with perfect evasion from the previous
section, the welfare e↵ects of a change in the cost of evasion are not necessarily
obvious. On the one hand, the capital controls are more binding when evasion is
costlier and therefore the planner can set the e↵ective inflow tax with greater ease.
On the other hand, however, costlier evasion implies greater distortions arising from
the evasion behavior of the financial sector.
Let ⌧( ) denote the sophisticated planner’s optimal inflow tax for a given value
of   and denote the value function for the maximized welfare function by u(⌧( ),  ).
Di↵erentiating with respect to  , we get:
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du
d 
=
@u
@⌧
· @⌧
@ 
+
@u
@ 
(2.36)
Since ⌧( ) is the inflow tax that maximizes welfare, we know by the Envelope The-
orem that @u/@⌧ = 0. We can therefore express the derivative of the value function
as:
du
d 
= d 

1
d
  (1 + r⇤ + ✓d+ '+  )
 
   d@
@ 
  z (2.37)
where d  < 0 is the partial derivative of equilibrium capital inflows with respect to
  and @/@  < 0 is the response of e↵ective evasion, , to a marginal change in  .
Using the first-order condition (2.31), this can be rewritten as:
du
d 
=  d
✓
d 
d⌧
@
@⌧
  @
@ 
◆
  z (2.38)
Let  p and   denote the elasticities, respectively, of p and of  with respect to  .
With a bit more manipulation,6 we can express the welfare impact of a change in
the unit cost of evasion as:
du
d 
= ( p +  )z   z (2.39)
This expression is ambiguous in sign and therefore implies that a decrease in the
unit cost of evasion can either have positive or negative e↵ect on welfare. Intuitively,
the welfare e↵ect can be decomposed into two terms. The first and positive term
consists of the welfare gains from increasing the equilibrium enforcement probability
6Specifically, note that d /d⌧ = /p(⌧) and that
@
@⌧ = p
0(⌧)@@  . Using these two results and
rearraning, we get: dud  =  d
⇣

p(·)p
0(·)@@    @@ 
⌘
. Noting that @p@ 
 
p =
⇣
p0(·)@@ 
⌘
 
p , and using the
definitions  p =
@p
@ 
 
p and   =  @@   /, we get the result stated in (2.39).
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of capital controls plus the reduction in the e↵ective evasion expenditure due to the
change in unit cost. The second and negative term reflects the welfare losses arising
from a given level of evasion.
Clearly, an increase in the unit cost of evasion will only increase welfare if  p+  >
1 is satisfied. In this case, policies aimed at discouraging evasion – e.g. increasing
administrative resources devoted to monitoring or closing regulatory loopholes – will
result in a net welfare gain. However, in the perverse case where  p +   < 1 holds,
regulatory changes that discourage evasion by increasing its cost could inadvertently
lead to a net welfare loss. This is because while an increase in   increases the
equilibrium enforcement probability and reduces e↵ective evasion, these gains are
fully o↵set by the higher deadweight loss from the bank’s evasion.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
The formal analysis presented in this paper supports the intuition that imper-
fectly binding capital controls can still e↵ectively segment the international and
domestic financial markets if evasion is costly. It also validates the idea that capital
controls are relatively more or less binding depending on the number of regulatory
loopholes and the sophistication of the financial sector. However, our welfare anal-
ysis suggests that when evasion is costly, capital controls can no longer perfectly
internalize externalities arising from capital flows due to the ine ciencies associated
with evasion. Moreover, if domestic authorities fail to properly anticipate financial
sector e↵orts to avoid the capital controls, as was the case with the “naive planner”
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in the models above, they could inadvertently set an e↵ective tax on capital flows
that is either too high or too low from a societal perspective.
All of these caveats on the optimal use of capital controls, of course, depend
critically on assumptions about what the relevant social welfare function should be.
For example, if banks in our model were foreign owned and the domestic planner
placed no weight on the welfare of foreigners, it is easy to see from the above analysis
that capital controls could always implement the first-best outcome. This is because
if banks were assumed to be foreign owned, the costs incurred by attempting to avoid
the capital controls would no longer impact national income and the capital inflow
tax could be set without having to consider the evasion costs.
We can conjecture that the key insights from the models presented above do not
depend crucially on the stylized formulation of the Dutch disease externality. One
could easily generalize the model to include a nontradable goods sector and a labor
market, with learning-by-doing externalities in the tradable sector as in Michaud and
Rothert [89]. While this would provide a more detailed rationale for imposing capital
controls in order to promote a competitive real exchange rate undervaluation, it likely
would not yield any major additional insights regarding the impact of regulatory
evasion.
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CHAPTER 3
DID QUANTITATIVE EASING INCREASE INCOME
INEQUALITY?
3.1 Introduction
A controversy over the distributional impact of Federal Reserve monetary policy
has erupted. Some politicians, pundits and even former central bankers have argued
that, since the Great Financial Crisis struck in 2008, the Federal Reserve’s near-zero
interest rate policy and rounds of “unconventional” monetary policy have contributed
to an increase in income and wealth inequality in the United States by promoting
large increases in asset prices, and driving down returns to middle class savers with
“money in the bank” (Brookings [19]). On the other side, former Federal Reserve
Chair Ben Bernanke, current Chair Janet Yellen, and others have argued that Fed
policy has been broadly supportive of those at the bottom and in the middle of
the income distribution, largely because policy placed a floor under the economic
collapse, and, since then, has promoted economic recovery, employment creation,
and economic growth (Bernanke [12], Appelbaum [2]). This discussion is not just
of historical interest: it interjects considerations of inequality into the very lively
debate over whether the Federal Reserve should raise interest rates and if so, by how
much.
70
Public debates over the distributional e↵ects of monetary policy are certainly not
unheard of but they tend to have a counter-cyclical profile. Politicians and main-
stream economists tend to ignore the issue during periods of prosperity, preferring
to focus on “aggregate” issues such as inflation and growth1 In contrast, in times of
financial crisis and resulting active intervention by the Federal Reserve, these dis-
tributional issues finally appear on the radar of politicians and make their way into
economic discourse. A key example is the “Volcker” disinflation policy and deep
recession of the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. At that time, the Federal Reserve was
accused by some as raising interest rates excessively aggressively and keeping them
too high for too long, leading to excessive levels of unemployment and job destruc-
tion, all in the interest of protecting the real wealth of bankers and other creditors
from the scourge of inflation (Epstein [38], Greider [55]).
Indeed, the question of the distributional impact of monetary policy has a longer
history, going back, for example, to the writings of Keynes who criticized high interest
rates pursued by the Bank of England in the 1920’s and 30’s, and the related decision
by Britain to return to the gold standard at pre-war parity after the First World War.
Reminiscent of the discussion during the Volcker period, Keynes accused the Bank
of England and the treasury of trying to protect creditors’ wealth, while ignoring
the impacts of tight money and an over-valued currency on the incomes and jobs of
workers (Keynes [68, 69]. And, going further back, of course one should remember
the fights over the gold standard and the populist movement in the late 19th early
1See Gornemann et al. [54] for a review of these models.
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20th century US, where over-valued exchange rates and over-valued currencies were
battled over on distributional, and highly rhetorical, terms (Goodwyn [53], Frieden
[48]).
What is striking in the current debate is this: in all the historical cases mentioned
earlier, it is high interest rates and restrictive monetary policy that are indicted as
transferring income from the poor to the rich, whereas in the current period, the
accusation is that it is low interest rates and expansionary monetary policy that is
making inequality worse. Can both of these claims be true? Are there special factors
that characterize the US economy now that generate results the opposite of those
historically claimed?
While theory has an important role to play in understanding the relationship
between monetary policy and income distribution in di↵erent periods and structural
contexts, ultimately, adjudicating these claims becomes an empirical question.
There are two broad approaches to looking at the distributional impacts of mone-
tary policy, or any policy for that matter. One looks at the functional distribution of
income, and the second looks at the impact of policy on the personal distribution of
income. In fact, the concerns expressed by Keynes and the populists, as mentioned
above, largely relate to the functional distribution. Keynes and the populists were
concerned about the impact of high interest rates on the incomes of the “financiers”
or “rentiers” versus the workers and or the farmers. Concerns with the impact of
monetary policy on financiers or bank profits, versus farmers and/or workers thus
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has a long history, though empirical work on this topic is thin (but see, for example,
Epstein and Ferguson [39] and the research summarized in Frieden [48]).2
Most of the discussion on this issue, however, has focused on the impact of mon-
etary policy on the distribution of personal or household income, and generally has
not covered the period since the beginning of the Great Recession and QE. This
small and relatively recent literature has found a strong relationship between con-
tractionary monetary policy and increases in inequality. A careful and widely cited
paper by Coibion [27] analyzes empirically this question for the United States, but
their data ends in 2008, just before the beginning of QE. Drawing on quarterly dis-
tributional data from the Consumer Expenditures Survey (CEX), they analyze the
distributional impacts of monetary policy shocks (based on the method of Romer and
Romer [106] for identifying monetary policy shocks), as well as the impacts of longer
term changes in the objectives of the Federal Reserve. They find that restrictive
“monetary policy shocks have statistically significant e↵ects on inequality: a con-
2We have undertaken several papers looking at the distributional impacts of QE with respect to
a functional or sectoral perspective. In Montecino and Epstein [90] we assess the direct impact of
the first round of asset purchases (popularly referred to as “QE1”) on the profits of banks that sold
MBS to the Federal Reserve, as well as the indirect impact on those that held large quantities of such
assets prior to QE. We found that QE1 led to statistically and economically significant increases
in bank profitability after controlling for common determinants of bank profits. In Montecino and
Epstein [91] we carried out a broader event study of all three rounds of QE (1, 2, and 3) and
examined the impact of QE policy announcements on the equity returns of all S&P 500 firms. Our
results uncovered substantial heterogeneity in the impact of QE announcements on equity returns
across sectors and across QE rounds. Consistent with our previous study, financial institutions were
expected to be the big beneficiaries of QE1, with consistently positive and substantial abnormal
returns, but were also joined by non-financial firms in the construction and automobile sectors. By
the time of QE3, however, the expected impact of the Federal Reserve’s asset purchases had waned
across most sectors of the economy with the exception of financial firms, which continued to exhibit
positive abnormal returns.
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tractionary monetary policy shock raises the observed inequality across households
in income, labor earnings, expenditures and consumption (emphasis added). . . In ad-
dition, (contractionary) monetary policy shocks appear to have played a non-trivial
role in accounting for cyclical fluctuations in inequality over this time period. . . ”
They also “show that permanent decreases in the inflation target also systematically
increase income and consumption inequality. . .Monetary policy therefore may well
have played a more significant role in driving recent historical inequality patterns in
the US than one might have expected.”
Gornemann et al. [54] reach a similar conclusion using a di↵erent approach.
They build a New Keynesian model which allows for heterogeneous agents, incom-
plete asset markets and significant labor market frictions. Their approach contrasts
with standard models that make assumptions that rule out distributional impacts of
monetary policy – assumptions such as homogenous agents, perfect unemployment
insurance, and perfect financial markets. Calibrating their model on publicly avail-
able US data, they find that contractionary “monetary policy shocks have strikingly
di↵erent implications for the welfare of di↵erent segments of the population.” In
particular, “while households in the top 5 percent of the wealth distribution benefit
slightly from a contractionary monetary policy shock, the bottom 5 percent would
lose from this measure. For example, a monetary tightening of 1 percentage point
(annualized) induces a loss equivalent to a permanent .1 percent consumption for
the lowest 5 percent of the wealth distribution. This heterogeneity in sign and size
of welfare losses from monetary policy shocks stands in stark contrast to TFP (total
factor productivity) shocks which a↵ect the population more uniformly.” (P. 4).
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Empirical literature on the distributional impacts of the loose monetary policy
undertaken since the Great Financial Crisis is quite thin. Notable contributions
include Bell et al. [9], Bivens [14], McKinsey Global [88], Doepka et al. [31], Beraja
et al. [11], and Montecino and Epstein [90, 91]. The results are mixed. Part of
the challenge in this literature is to distinguish between the impacts of the near-zero
interest rate policy pursued by the Fed and QE policies themselves. Distinguishing
these policies present both theoretical and empirical challenges. Theoretically, the
question is whether the policies have di↵erent mechanisms and channels of influence;
and empirically, it is di cult to ascertain whether the impacts discerned after the
implementation of QE are lagged impacts of zero interest rate policies, or some
interaction of the two. Various papers deal with these issues di↵erently.
The literature on the impacts of monetary policy in general and QE in particular
has tried to distinguish among the specific channels through which policy could a↵ect
income distribution. Ben Bernanke presents a useful list of proposed distributional
channels of QE and low interest rates (Bernanke [12]):
1. The “asset price appreciation” channel: Bernanke notes that “The claim that
Fed policy has worsened inequality usually begins with the (correct) observation
that monetary easing works in part by raising asset prices, like stock prices.
As the rich own more assets than the poor and the middle class, the reasoning
goes, the Fed’s policies are increasing the already large disparities of wealth in
the United States.”
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An additional dis-equalizing aspect of this financial asset channel is the lower
interest rate on short term assets, which might disproportionately a↵ect less rich
households (Bell et al. [9] and McKinsey Global [88]) emphasize this channel).
Bernanke notes two important caveats about the importance of the asset price
appreciation channel in the current context. He argues that middle class households,
not just the wealthy, hold financial assets. And Bernanke raises questions about the
extent to which asset price increases, and especially stock price increases are due to
QE or are, rather, simply a “return to trend.” He also notes that wealthy households
also hold short term assets whose returns decline due to zero interest rate policies.
Bernanke then goes on to describe what he calls the inequality countervailing
channels.
2. The “employment” channel: “. . . easier monetary policies promote job cre-
ation. . . ”
3. The “debtor redistribution and refinancing” channel: “All else equal, debtors
tend to benefit (and creditors lose) from higher inflation which reduces the real
value of debts. Debtors are generally poorer than creditors, so on this count
easier monetary policy. . . reduces inequality. . . Debtors are also made better o↵
by low interest rates, all else equal. For example, homeowners with mortgages
benefit when they can refinance at a lower rate.”
As this list of channels suggest, there are important forces that move in counter-
vailing directions. In our analysis below, we try to measure the size of the impacts
of these channels. The real issue of concern, however, is not simply the evolution of
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these channels over time, but the role of monetary policy and QE: how much of the
change in income distribution via these channels is due to QE, and how much is due
to other factors?
In fact, there has been an enormous amount of empirical investigation of the
e↵ects of QE on many of these channels considered separately. The greatest e↵ort
has been expended on analyzing the impact of QE on various asset prices (see, for
example, Krishnamurthy and Vissing [76] and Hancock and Passmore [57]; also see
Engen et al. [37] and Bivens [14] reviews of this voluminous literature). The consen-
sus in this literature is that QE has lowered mortgage interest rates, lowered short
and long term treasury rates, and thereby caused appreciations in long term treasury
bonds, and mortgage backed securities (MBS). There is also some evidence that QE
has increased the price of corporate bonds. Evidence on the impacts on corporate
equities is more mixed, but recent papers suggest that equity prices have increased as
a result of QE (Kiley [70]; see our discussion below). As for the employment channel,
most evidence indicates that zero-interest rate policy and QE have contributed to
employment growth, but real wages have been stagnant, or even declining over this
period (Engen et al. [37], Bivens [15]). The over-all impact on income distribution
will thus depend on the net e↵ect and the distribution of these two components
across income groups.
There has not been much research on the debt redistribution channel during this
period. Part of the problem is that inflation has not increased as a result of QE.
Hence, this inflation channel has not been operative (see Doepke et al. [31] for a
discussion of this channel). The mortgage refinancing channel is more interesting
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and potentially important; indeed, creating more opportunities for refinancing and
lowering refinancing costs, presumably were some of the goals of the low interest
rate and QE policies. However, as Beraja et al. [11] and others referenced there
show, the steep declines in house prices, which meant that many borrowers were
“under water”, along with other complex factors, severely limited the ability of many
homeowners, and particularly those in the lower quantiles of the income distribution,
from taking advantage of the lower interest rates. Thus, the distributional impacts
of the refinancing channel are very much up for grabs empirically. Consistent with
this e↵ect, Beraja et al. show that there was a large disparity in the regional impacts
of QE policy as a function of how far housing prices had fallen in di↵erent regions of
the country.
The only previous paper that has attempted to put together many of these chan-
nels and look at the overall impact of QE on income distribution is Bivens [14].
Bivens does not distinguish in his analysis between the near-zero interest rate policy
and the QE policy, arguing that it is impossible to disentangle the e↵ects of these two
related e↵orts. Bivens’ approach is to use the secondary literature rather than new
empirical work. He has a two stage approach: first Bivens assess the overall impacts
on inequality of QE relative to a fiscal policy that has a similar impact on employ-
ment. And then, he assesses the impact of low interest rates and QE relative to a
neutral monetary policy. In the first case, Bivens argues that QE does not increase
inequality relative to a fiscal policy that has a similar labor market outcome.
In the second case – monetary policy vs nothing – Bivens argues that the dis-
equalizing e↵ects of financial asset price increases are more than compensated for by
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increases in incomes of the non-rich due to increases in employment. Moreover, he
argues that non-rich households’ major asset is their home, and shows that home
price appreciation was considerable over the QE period. The bottom line in the
second case, according to Bivens is the following: “As bad and unequal as wage
growth was since the onset of the Great Recession, it would have been even slower
and less equal had the Fed not pursued its easy money policies. In short, compared
to a counterfactual of no change in fiscal policy in response to a recession, monetary
stimulus reduces inequality significantly.”
Our paper also attempts to draw an overall picture of the net impacts of these sev-
eral channels on the personal distribution of income.3 We use data from the Federal
Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) to empirically assess the quantitative
contribution of each of these theoretical channels to changes in inequality. We focus
specifically on the distribution of what we term “net income,” which consists of to-
tal household income minus debt payments. This makes it possible to integrate the
distributional consequences of low interest rates on households’ interest burdens. To
assess the net impact of channels associated with QE, we implement the distribu-
tional decompositions method proposed by Firpo et al. [43]. This approach enables
detailed accounting of the observed change in a distributional statistic between two
periods and how much of this change is due to channels associated with QE. Specif-
ically, it makes it possible to decompose the change in, for example, the ratio of the
3When we can, we distinguish between the low interest policy and the QE policy and mostly
focus on QE. At a few points, however, we will discuss the impacts of the broader loose monetary
policy since the financial meltdown.
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95th to the 10th percentiles of the net income distribution into the contributions
of changes in employment, returns on financial assets, and other covariates. Thus,
this decomposition method provides well defined estimates of the quantitative con-
tribution of various factors a↵ecting the distribution of household income since the
implementation of QE.
Our overall results are the following: we find that while employment changes and
mortgage refinancing were highly equalizing during the QE period, these impacts
were nonetheless swamped by the large dis-equalizing e↵ects of equity price appre-
ciations. Reductions in returns to short term assets added further to dis-equalizing
processes between the periods. Bond price appreciations, surprisingly, had little dis-
tributional impact. It is worth emphasizing that this decomposition approach does
not yield causal estimates of the impact of QE on the distribution of income. This
approach does, however, yield well defined estimates of the relative importance of
the various channels through which QE a↵ects inequality and thus makes it possible
to precisely frame the upper and lower bound causal impacts of QE under plausible
assumptions about the counterfactual paths of employment and stock prices. To get
some idea of the causal influences we use the results from our decomposition to carry
out a series of “counterfactual exercises” to assess the quantitative range of impacts
of QE on the main channels. Drawing on consensus QE impact estimates from the
empirical literature, we conclude that, most likely, QE was modestly dis-equalizing,
despite having positive impacts on employment and mortgage refinancing.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe
in more detail the channels of monetary policy we will study and describe the “net
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income” measure we will use to map these channels onto income changes. In section
3 we discuss important data issues that we must deal with in using our data set.
Section 4 presents our empirical methodology for analyzing the evolution of income
distribution during the QE period. Section 5 presents our distributional results.
Section 6 attempts to frame a causal analysis of the impacts of QE on inequality
by using a counter-factual analysis based on consensus impacts from the literature.
Section 7 summarizes and concludes with some remarks about the implications for
the debate over QE’s impacts on income distribution.
3.2 Net income and the theoretical e↵ects of QE
The onset of the 2007-8 financial crisis led the Federal Reserve to lower short-
term interest rates to nearly zero in an e↵ort to prop up the financial sector and
prevent the U.S. economy from sliding into a depression. With nominal rates up
against the zero lower bound and thus having exhausted the traditional tools of
monetary policy, the Fed resorted to “unconventional” measures. In particular, the
Federal Reserve announced a program to purchase vast amounts of securities in what
is known as the Large Scale Asset Purchase program (LSAP), or alternatively as
“Quantitative Easing” (QE). The first round of asset purchases (QE1) was formally
announced on November 25, 2008 and initially covered Agency mortgage-backed
securities (MBS), long-term Treasuries, and government-sponsored enterprises (GSE)
debt. A second round of purchases (QE2) was subsequently announced on November
3, 2010, followed by a third and final round (QE3) beginning in August 2012. The
Federal Reserve o cially announced the end of QE3 on October 29, 2014.
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As already noted, QE is expected to a↵ect the distribution of income through a
variety of countervailing channels.4 The two most commonly cited channels – and
perhaps most controversial – are through the e↵ect of asset purchases and low interest
rates on employment and the prices of financial assets. The third channel we focus
on is on the impact of low interest rates on household debt service.
The employment channel is presumed to decrease inequality, though note that this
should not necessarily hold a priori. The overall impact of changes in employment
on inequality depends both on which parts of the distribution experience the greater
increase in employment, as well as the relative returns to employment across the
distribution. For instance, it could be the case that firms respond to expansionary
monetary policy by increasing total employment but by mostly hiring among high-
skilled and high-paying jobs. Similarly, even if the bottom range of the distribution
has greater employment gains, if wages in the upper tail are su ciently larger, the
relatively smaller employment gains at the top could still translate into increases in
overall inequality.
Financial asset prices are expected to a↵ect income inequality through capital
gains and interest and dividend income. The sign of this channel is potentially
ambiguous for two reasons. On the one hand, richer households are likely to reap the
majority of capital gains from increases in asset prices since ownership of equities
and bonds is highly concentrated at the top. On the other hand, QE likely reduced
4See Coibion [27] for a detailed discussion for the channels through which traditional monetary
policy might a↵ect inequality. For a discussion specifically applied to QE see Bivens [14].
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interest rates on short-term and long-term assets, potentially o↵setting the capital
gains.
In theory, expansionary monetary policy should also benefit debtors at the ex-
pense of creditors. Since low income households are more likely to be indebted,
expansionary monetary policy should decrease inequality. In practice, this is ex-
pected to result from the e↵ects of higher inflation, which reduces the real value of
debt, and through the direct impact of lower interest rates on household debt pay-
ments. Although interest rates have remained at historically low levels due to the
Federal Reserve’s crisis response, it is not obvious if most household have been able
to take advantage of them. Indeed, a number of commentators have argued that
the fall in housing prices and the tightening in lending standards have prevented
indebted household from refinancing at a lower interest rate. For instance, a Federal
Reserve White Paper on housing noted:
Many homeowners have been unable to take advantage of histori-
cally low mortgage rates because of low or negative home equity, slightly
blemished credit, or tighter credit standards. Perhaps only about half of
homeowners who could profitably refinance have the equity and credit-
worthiness needed to qualify for traditional refinancing. (Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System, 2012 [16])
This relationship between falling home prices and the ability to refinance was inves-
tigated by Feroli et al. [42], who showed that states with small declines in home
prices experienced booms in refinancing during the post-crisis period while states
with large home price declines experienced a collapse in refinancing rates. As Feroli
et al. write, “the evidence suggests that a large fraction of homeowners in large
83
house price decline states are unable to take advantage of lower mortgage interest
rates.”
Standard definitions of income are inadequate to investigate the interest burden
channel since they do not include debt payments. Indeed, there is no reason to
expect a fall in interest rates to have a direct e↵ect on household income other than
through a negative e↵ect via interest-paying assets and macroeconomic spillovers. To
directly incorporate the distributional consequences of household debt burdens, we
alternatively define net household income, which consists of total household income –
wages, dividends, capital gains, government transfers, and business income – minus
total interest payments on debt. The low interest rates associated with expansionary
monetary policy should therefore be associated with lower debt service and hence
higher net income. Formally, we define net income as:
Net Income = Wages+ Interest+Business+Gov (3.1)
+Capital gains   Debt payments
In equation (3.1), Wages denotes total wage income, Interest denotes all interest
and dividends income, Business stands for any income from owning a controlling
share or running a business, Gov denotes government transfers, Capital gains stands
for realized capital gains on financial assets, and Debt payments are total annual
expenditure on debt service. Defining net income this way has several advantages.
First, it is not possible to directly examine the reduced debt burden channel of expan-
sionary monetary policy using traditional definitions of income. Second, including
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capital gains as a component of net income makes it possible to assess the financial
assets price channel.
Summary statistics for household total and net income are presented in Table
3.1. Although broadly similar, it is worth highlighting a few di↵erences between the
two definitions of income. As one would expect, net income tends to be lower than
total income. Mean total income was approximately $84,000 in the 2010 SCF sample
compared to around $72,000 for net income. Net income appears to have somewhat
di↵erent dynamics between periods than total income. For instance, while median
total income fell between the 2010 and 2013 SCF samples, median net income actually
increased slightly. Finally, net income appears to be more concentrated at the top
than total income, indicating that poorer households are either more heavily indebted
than richer households, face higher interest rates on debt, or both. Moreover, this
discrepancy between the two definitions is even more pronounced at the very top
of the distribution. Although ratio of the 90th to 50th percentiles are roughly the
same between the two definitions, the 90/10 and 99/10 ratio are much larger for net
income.
To examine contribution of each factor to overall changes in household net income
we begin by defining functional forms for each relevant component. Fortunately for
our purposes, each of the three channels through which QE might a↵ect the distri-
bution of net income maps cleanly onto a component of net income: unemployment
drives wage income, financial assets drive capital gains, and debt refinancing a↵ects
interest payments. The wage income of household i during period t is assumed to
depend on:
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Wagesit = ↵tEMPit + ⌧Xit + ✏it (3.2)
where EMP is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the head of the household
is employed and equal to zero otherwise. The wage function also includes a vector
of controls for demographic and human capital factors, including race, age, and
education. Total financial income, which combines interest and dividend income and
realized capital gains, is assumed to depend linearly on the ownership of various
financial assets:
Capital gains it = Ait t + "it (3.3)
where Ait is a vector of dummy variables for whether or not household i owns a non-
zero amount of each type of financial asset. We specify our model using ownership
dummies due to the highly skewed distribution of the levels of the financial assets
we consider, as well as the large proportion of households with financial balances
of zero. Financial assets ownership is broken up into three broad categories: (1)
equities, either directly held stocks or in mutual funds; (2) directly held bonds; and
(3) short-term/liquid assets. Each element of the vector  it can be interpreted as the
rate of return on each financial asset in Ait.
Debt service is assumed to be a linear function of mortgage refinancing as well
as overall credit worthiness, which we capture by including variables for whether or
not a survey respondent has feared or actually been denied credit during the period
or has recently filed for bankruptcy. Household interest payments thus depend on:
Debt payments it =  tRFit + ⌘tDit + µtBit + ⌫it (3.4)
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where RFit is dummy for having refinanced the primary mortgage within the last
three years, Dit is a dummy for fearing or having been denied credit during the
period, and Bit is a dummy for having recently filed for bankruptcy. Adding the
components together, we arrive at a functional form for net household income:
Net Income it = b1tEMPit + ⌧Xit + b2tAit + b3tRFit + b4tDit + b5tBit + eit (3.5)
where eit is a composite error term of "it, ✏it, and ⌫it. In order to identify the
contribution of each factor in the decomposition exercises reported below, we will
assume:
E{eit|EMPit, Xit, Ait, RFit, Dit, Bit, t} =   for t = 0, 1 (3.6)
for some constant  . This is often referred to as the ignorability assumption and
is weaker than the more common assumption that unobservables are conditionally
independent. Ignorability does not assume that unobservables are mean independent
of covariates but instead that this dependence is the same across both groups t. For
example, for our purposes we are interested in changes in net income between the
pre-QE (t = 0) and post-QE (t = 1) periods. In this context ignorability means that
any correlation between unobservable factors contributing to net income and, say,
stock ownership, is constant across both periods.
3.3 Data Issues
The Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) is almost ideal for assessing the impact
of financial and labor market factors on the distribution of income. The SCF o↵ers
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an unparalleled level of detail on a household’s balance sheet. It also contains a
full set of standard demographic and labor market variables. The SCF also records
information on mortgage refinancing, allowing us to answer questions about the role
of refinancing on household interest payments.
Nevertheless, the SCF is “almost” ideal due to several shortcomings that com-
plicate its usage. First, due to its relatively small sample size, many variables that
would be useful are withheld from the public data releases in order to prevent users
from identifying the survey respondents. Specifically, geographical data and inter-
view dates are omitted. The former makes it impossible to control for geographic-
specific unobserved e↵ects. Second, the SCF is only released every 3 years and the
cross-sectional sample for each release spans the entire 3 year window. Combined
with the absence of publicly available interview dates, this makes it very di cult to
split the survey data across precise event dates. Specifically, the 2007 release includes
interviews collected from 2005 to 2007, the 2010 release includes 2008 to 2010, and
the 2013 release includes 2011 to 2013. Therefore, it is not possible to cleanly split
the data between the pre and post QE period, which began at the end of 2010.
We settle on treating the observations in the 2010 survey as the pre QE period
(t = 0) and the 2013 survey as the post period (t = 1). Admittedly, our “pre
QE” period is not ideal since it is contaminated by the first round of QE, which
took place between the end of 2009 and 2010. Nevertheless, this choice of periods
is unavoidable given the data constraints and reasonably captures the timing of the
fallout from the crisis and the path of the subsequent recovery. In other words, the
2010 SCF release, which includes 2009 and 2008, is the only release that includes real
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crisis years.5 This problem, however, is not as severe as it may first seem. This is
because the macroeconomic e↵ects of QE likely occurred with substantial lags. For
instance, Engen et al. [37] found that the peak impact of QE on employment did
not take place until as late as 2015. Moreover, the second and third rounds of QE
took place after 2010, as did most of the post-crisis growth in stock prices.
A third issue that causes more technical problems for estimation and inference is
that the SCF is released as a set of multiple imputed datasets. This means that each
data release contains 5 versions of each observation for each di↵erent method used
to impute the missing variables. Informally, this is di cult to deal with because it
means that the SCF is actually five di↵erent datasets instead of one. More precisely,
the presence of five imputations causes the coe cients to be biased and the standard
errors to be too small. Although there is no perfect solution to the first two problems,
there exists a more or less standard solution to estimating and carrying out inference
with multiple imputations. This is the repeated imputations inference (RII) method
pioneered by Rubin [109], which first estimates the empirical model separately for
each imputation and then combines the estimated coe cients and standard errors
5Specifically, unemployment only increases during the 2010 SCF release and falls during the 2013
release. The unemployment rate for the head of the household in the 2007 release is 4.1 percent.
This increased to 7.1 percent in the 2010 release and fell to 5.9 percent in the 2013 release.
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to carryout inference.6 All coe cients and standard errors reported below have been
adjusted using the RII method.
A final complication arises due to our definition of net income. It is common
in applied work to transform earnings variables by taking logs as this renders its
distribution approximately normal. This is not possible however in this case since
net income can also take on large negative values if debt service su ciently exceeds
income. Since negative observations would be undefined in logs, the transformation
would result in a significant loss of information. Note that this is also a problem for
stock variables with a significant number of zero observations. An alternative trans-
formation useful in this context is the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) function, which
was first proposed by Johnson [67].7 The IHS transformation is similar to transform-
ing variables using logs but has the added advantage of being continually defined
6Formally, let  ˆi and sˆei denote the estimated coe cients and standard errors for implicates
i = 1, 2, . . . ,M . Rubin’s RII method is to estimate all  ˆi’s separately and then combine them by
simply averaging over every implicate:
 ¯ =
1
M
MX
i=1
 ˆi
Correct standard errors can then be derived by combining the standard errors obtained from each
implicate separately as follows:
s˜e = s¯e+
✓
1 +
1
M
◆
V ar( ˆi)
where
s¯e =
1
M
MX
i=1
sˆei and V ar( ˆi) =
✓
1
M   1
◆ MX
i=1
( ˆi    ¯)2
The correct combined standard error is the sum of the average of the M estimated standard errors
and the variance of the coe cients across implicates.
7For a variable yi, the IHS transformation is calculated as IHS(y) = ln
⇣
y +
p
y2 + 1
⌘
.
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everywhere along the real numbers line. Moreover, coe cients of IHS transformed
variables can also be interpreted roughly as elasticities. The IHS transformation has
also been shown to outperform other common transformations in empirical appli-
cations related to household income and wealth. (Burbidge et al. [20], Pence [97]).
Given these advantages, in what follows net income and all stock variables have been
transformed using the IHS transformation.
3.4 The distributional decomposition
In order to decompose changes in the distribution of net income between the pre
and post QE periods we implement an approach proposed by Firpo et al. [43], which
combines recentered influence functions (RIF) regressions with the popular Oaxaca-
Blinder decomposition method. This approach is easy to implement and makes it
possible to decompose changes in distributional statistics into the contribution of
changes in covariates or endowments and the contribution of changes in the coe -
cients or returns to factors. These components can also be further decomposed into
the contribution of each individual covariate, enabling comparisons of the relative
contributions of di↵erent factors to the overall observed change in the distributional
statistic of interest.
First proposed by Firpo et al. [44], a RIF regression is essentially the same
as a standard regression except that it replaces the dependent variable Y with
the recentered influence function for a chosen distributional statistic. Adopting
the notation from Firpo et al. [43], let ⌫ denote a given distributional statistic
(e.g. the gini coe cient or 90th quantile). The RIF for statistic ⌫ is defined as
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RIF (y; ⌫) = ⌫(Fy) + IF (y; ⌫), where y is an individual observation of Y , Fy is
the cumulative density function of Y , and IF (y; ⌫) denote the influence function
corresponding to statistic ⌫ at y. The advantage of using the recentered influ-
ence function is that its expectation yields the original statistic of interest, so that
E{RIF (y; ⌫)} = ⌫. The RIF regression assumes that the conditional expectation of
RIF (y; ⌫) is a linear function of the explanatory variables X:
E{RIF (Y ; ⌫)|X} = X  + ✏
where the coe cients   can be estimated using OLS.
Therefore, all that is necessary to estimate the partial e↵ects of the dependent
variables X on a statistic ⌫ to first calculate the[RIF for ⌫ and then run a standard
regression of[RIF on X. For example, for the ⌧th quantile, Q⌧ , one first calculates
the RIF as
[RIF (y; Qˆ⌧ ) = Qˆ⌧ +
⌧   1{y  Qˆ⌧}
fˆy(Qˆ⌧ )
(3.7)
where Qˆ⌧ and fˆy(·) are, respectively, estimates of quantile ⌧ and the probability
density function of Y , and 1{·} is an indicator function. In practice, the density fˆy
is estimated using Kernel methods.
As shown by Firpo et al. [43], the linearity assumption for E{RIF (Y ; ⌫)|X}
makes it possible to apply the classic Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method to RIF
regressions and decompose general distributional statistics other than just the mean.8
8In order to identify the each component of the decomposition it is also necessary to assume com-
mon support for both comparison groups, as well as either conditional independence on observables
or ignorability.
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Let t = 0, 1 denote the pre and post QE time periods. The change in, say, the 90th
net income quantile between the two periods can be written as
 90 = Qˆ1,90   Qˆ0,90 = X¯1 ˆ1   X¯0 ˆ0
The decomposition is given by:
 90 =  X +   + X  (3.8)
 90 =
 
X¯1   X¯0
 
 ˆ0| {z }
endowments
+( ˆ1    ˆ0) X¯0| {z }
coe cients
+
 
X¯1   X¯0
 
( ˆ1    ˆ0)| {z }
interaction
The components  X and    capture, respectively, the contribution of changes in
endowments and the the contribution of changes in returns. The term X  is referred
to as the “interaction” component. Each component can be further decomposed into
the contribution of each variable in X. For example, the contribution of changes in
the coe cients of the k-th independent variable can be calculated simply as   ,k =
( ˆ1,k    ˆ0,k) X¯0,k.
The endowments and coe cients components of the decomposition have intuitive
interpretations. The endowment component can be interpreted as the contribution
of a change in the endowment of a factor Xk between the two periods holding its
return constant. For instance, in the case of the stock of financial assets held by a
household, the endowments component can be interpreted as the extra interest or
capital gains income the household would receive from increasing its financial assets
by X1   X0 obtaining last period’s rate of return  0. The coe cients component,
on the other hand, can be interpreted as the contribution to household net income
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of a change in the return to a given factor holding the endowment constant at last
period’s level. In the case of financial assets, it is the extra income received from
a change  1    0 in the rate of return on financial assets holding the stock fixed.
The interaction component, which is perhaps harder to interpret, captures the con-
tribution of simultaneous changes in endowments and coe cients. Keeping with the
example of financial assets, the interaction component measures the contribution of
both changes in returns and the amount owned.
Putting the pieces together, the steps necessary to carry out the decomposition
can be summarized as follows:
• Calculate the recentered influence function for net income for each period t =
0, 1.
• Run separate RIF regressions for each period, for a set of quantiles Qt,⌧ , and
obtain the coe cients  ˆ0,⌧ ,  ˆ1,⌧ .
• Calculate the means of the explanatory variables in each period, X¯0, X¯1.
• Algebraically combine the estimated coe cients and means to obtain each com-
ponent of the decomposition.
3.5 Decomposition results
We start by calculating the recentered influence functions of net income for quan-
tiles Q⌧t , ⌧ = {5, 10, . . . , 95}.9 In addition, we calculate the RIFs for the gini coe -
9For all RIF calculations, we use the default Epanechnikov kernel when obtaining the probability
density of net income.
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cient. Next, we estimate (3.5) replacing the dependent variable Nit with its RIF for
each quantile ⌧ and for both periods t = 0, 1. The coe cients from the RIF regres-
sions are shown by quantile in Figure 3.1. The pre QE period (2008-10) coe cients
are depicted with triangles, while the circles depict the coe cients during the post
QE period (2011-13).
Intuitively, the RIF regression graphs show the unconditional partial e↵ect of a
variable of interest on each quantile of the distribution. For example, let’s consider
the employment graph (panel a). The level of the curve at the very middle of the
distribution (quantile 50) indicates the size of the coe cient on the employment
dummy for the median. In other words, the graph shows the e↵ect of employment
on median income. Similarly, going right on the graph – towards, say, quantile 90 –
shows the impact of employment on the net income of richer households. A smaller
coe cient on quantile 90 indicates that employment has a smaller impact on the net
income of the rich relative to the middle class. Thus, a downward sloping curve in
this context indicates that a given independent variable is equalizing in the sense
that it increases the bottom end of the distribution relative to the top. Conversely,
an upward slope indicates a disequalizing or regressive impact on the distribution of
net income.
Employment has a strong equalizing e↵ect on net income, as can be seen from the
downward sloping coe cients curve. This reflects the fact that wage income makes
up a much bigger share of total income for lower income households than for richer
ones. Since the income of households near the bottom of the distribution consists
almost entirely of wage earnings, the coe cient on EMP is close to one for the
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Figure 3.1: RIF regression coe cients during pre and post QE periods
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poorest households. In other words, households where the primary income earner is
employed have net incomes around 100 percent higher compared to those with an
unemployed primary earner. The importance of employment status decreases as one
moves higher up in the distribution of net income. Employment increases real median
income by around 40 percent and has an even smaller impact on the 90th quantile –
roughly 20 percent. The “return” to employment appears to have decreased between
the two periods, as indicated by the downward shift in the coe cients curve. This
can be interpreted as a fall in real wages over the two periods.
As expected, equity and bond ownership are highly disequalizing. This reflects
the fact that ownership of these types of assets is highly concentrated at the top. The
return on equities increased during the post QE period for the upper quantiles. This
increase was most pronounced for the 90th and above quantiles. Curiously, despite
the consensus in the empirical literature that QE boosted bond prices, the return on
directly held bonds was essentially flat over the two periods and actually decreased
mildly in the middle of the distribution. One possible explanation for this result
is that bond ownership impacts household income through interest revenue and not
through capital gains. As a result, households would not benefit from increases in
bond prices.
The RIF regression results also suggest that mortgage refinancing, as anticipated,
is associated with higher household net income, and this holds across most quantiles.
Nevertheless, mortgage refinancing appears to be regressive, with a much greater
impact near the top of the net income distribution. This implies that even if poor
households in need of refinancing gain access to credit, they may not receive as fa-
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vorable terms as those received by richer households. The coe cients for refinancing
also increase during the post QE period for middle quantiles, which is consistent
with the fall in interest rates brought on by QE.
To assess the actual quantitative contributions of each channel on inequality,
we now turn to the detailed decomposition results. Recall that the point of this
exercise is to decompose the overall estimated change in a distributional statistic
into a component explained by the change in levels of the independent variables,
and a second component due to the change in the coe cients. Also, note that in
the case of financial assets, the coe cients component can be interpreted as the
contribution of changes in the rate of return on financial assets. Thus, for example,
the coe cients component of equities is the contribution of rising stock prices on net
income via capital gains.
As alluded to in the introduction, it is worthwhile analytically to distinguish
between monetary policy in general and specific channels associated with QE. For
example, returns on short-term or liquid financial assets are clearly one channel
through which monetary policy may generally a↵ect the distribution of income but
is arguably not a channel specific to QE, which aimed to boost the economy through
purchases of longer-term assets. Therefore, it is useful to consider the contribution of
QE as a subset of the broader contribution of monetary policy. To focus the discus-
sion on the most hotly debated channels through which QE is expected to influence
inequality, we will refer to QE channels as the contributions of (1) the change in the
employment rate, (2) the change in the return on stocks, and (3) the overall con-
tribution of mortgage refinancing. Thus, we are intentionally distinguishing these
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specific channels from those associated with monetary policy more generally. We are
also excluding from this tally the contributions of returns on short-term assets, for
reasons already mentioned, and bonds. Bonds are excluded from the tally because
it is not possible to identify their maturity composition using the SCF data and
therefore it is not clear what share of the observed bond holdings would be sensitive
to price changes due to QE. The unexplained component of employment is also ex-
cluded from the QE channels tally. This is because it is not clear how QE should
a↵ect this component. It is also worth emphasizing that restricting our attention to
these specific channels results in a conservative estimate of the overall contribution
of QE channels to inequality during this period.
For expositional ease, Table 3.2 reports the decomposition results for the main
theoretical channels.10 Intuitively, each column reports the observed percentage
change (“total change”) in a given distributional measure and breaks up this total
into the percentage point contribution of each sub-component. Note that nothing in
this exercise precludes a component from “subtracting” from the total, which means
that a given channel may reduce inequality. Moreover, the total change in inequality
may actually be smaller than the contribution of a component. This would imply
that some components have a tendency to strongly increase inequality but are o↵set
by other equalizing factors that subtract from the measure of inequality during this
10The complete set of results for every variable in the specification, all distributional statistics,
and every decomposition component are available in the Appendix. Table C.3 reports the full
results for a range of inequality measures. Tables C.4 and C.5 report the decomposition results for
the bottom and top halves, respectively, of the distribution. These tables also include bootstrapped
standard errors for the decomposition components.
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period. Each column presents the decomposition result for a separate distributional
statistic, where the first three columns are devoted to inequality measures, including
ratio of the 95th to 10th percentiles, the 90/10 ratio, and the Gini coe cient. The
second set of columns report the level e↵ects on the 10th, 50th and 95th percentiles.
For each decomposed statistic, the first two rows report the total change in that
statistic and how much the combined QE channels contributed to that change.
The contributions of the three main theoretical channels are also depicted graph-
ically by quantile in Figures 3.2 through 3.4. The graphs show how much of the
change in net income of a given quantile is due to the component in question. As
with the RIF regression graphs discussed above, a downward sloping curve indicates
that the component is equalizing, in the sense that it contributed to a decrease in
inequality. Conversely, an upward sloping curve indicates that the component in
question increased inequality.
No matter what measure of inequality one uses, changes in the level of employ-
ment unambiguously decreased net income inequality. As can be seen in the fist
column of Table 3.2, although the ratio of the 95th to 10th quantiles grew by 5
percent, the increased employment rate (i.e. the endowment component) partially
o↵set this trend, subtracting nearly half a percentage point. Changes in employment
also had equalizing e↵ects on other measures of inequality. Specifically, the endow-
ments component of employment contributed -0.5 percentage points to the 90/10
ratio and -0.001 to the Gini coe cient. All three of these negative contributions are
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Figure 3.2: Contribution of changes in employment ( X) by quantile
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Note: This figure shows the endowments component of employment ( X) by quan-
tile. The vertical axis measures the percentage point change in each net income
quantile that is attributable to the change in the employment rate. The decomposi-
tion corresponds to the same specification presented in Tables C.3 through C.5. The
shaded area represents the 95% confidence interval.
statistically significant at standard significance levels using bootstrapped standard
errors.11
The equalizing contribution of employment to the distribution of net income can
also be inferred from Figure 3.2. The downward sloping curve for the explained
component indicates that employment gains contributed to much larger increases
in net income for bottom quantiles than for top quantiles. Changes in employment
contributed 0.7 percentage points of growth to the 10th quantile. The contribution
11Standard errors were calculated using the bootstrap replication weights provided by the SCF
dataset combined with the RII technique for datasets with repeated imputations. All specifications
include 300 repetitions.
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to median income growth was roughly 0.4 of a percentage point. By contrast, the
contribution of higher employment to the net income of the top was much smaller. A
surprising result from the decompositions is that the coe cients component of em-
ployment – the contribution attributable to changes in the returns to employment –
has no statistically significant e↵ect on inequality (see Table C.3 in the Appendix).
Concretely, this means that changes in real wages were distributionally neutral be-
tween these two periods, or at least not pronounced enough to detect in this data
and framework.
Equity ownership appears to have contributed to an increase in the incomes of the
top of the distribution (see Figure 3.3). The main component of interest is the coef-
ficients component, which can be interpreted as the increase in stock returns during
the post-QE period. This component contributed a whopping 6.3 percentage points
to the 95/10 ratio and thus was highly disequalizing, dwarfing the comparatively
modest equalizing impact of increasing employment. This 6.3 percent contribution
is actually larger than the observed growth of the 95/10 ratio, suggesting that this
positive contribution was o↵set by other equalizing factors. Similarly, equity returns
also had an oversized impact on the gini coe cient, contributing 0.013, or roughly
four fifths of the 0.016 observed change. Nevertheless, the large contribution of
stock returns is due to large e↵ects at the upper end of the distribution. Indeed,
the coe cients component is only statistically significant for the 90th percentile and
above.
Other financial assets had a mixed contribution to inequality. As expected, the
return on short-term financial assets, which consist of checking accounts, certificates
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Figure 3.3: Contributions of financial assets returns (  )
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(b) Bonds
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(c) Short-term Assets
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Note: This figure shows the coe cients
component of various financial assets (  )
by quantile. The vertical axes measure the
percentage point change in each net income
quantile that is attributable to the change
in the return on the given financial as-
set. The decomposition corresponds to the
same specification presented in Tables C.3
through C.5. The shaded area represents
the 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 3.4: Contribution of mortgage refinancing
(a) Endowments component ( X)
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(b) Coe cients component (  )
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Note: This figure shows both the endowments ( X) and coe cients (  ) compo-
nents of mortgage refinancing by quantile. The vertical axes measure the percentage
point change in each net income quantile that is attributable to refinancing. The
decomposition corresponds to the same specification presented in Tables C.3 through
C.5. The shaded area represents the 95% confidence interval based on bootstrapped
standard errors with 100 repetitions.
of deposit, and ordinary savings accounts, disproportionately decreased the income
of poorer households around the 10th percentile of the distribution while having
a nearly neutral e↵ect on richer households. As a consequence, the contribution of
short-term asset returns to the 90/10 ratio was sizable – roughly 17 percentage points
– though this amount is not statistically significant. Changes in bond returns do not
appear to have a significant e↵ect on any of the distributional statistics we consider.
While nearly all quantiles benefitted from both higher refinancing rates – reflect-
ing easier access to credit – as well as a greater return on refinancing – reflecting lower
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interest rates on refinanced mortgage debt (Figure 3.4), the distributional impact of
mortgage refinancing is nuanced. For example, the greater availability of refinancing
credit was highly regressive, as can be seen by the upward sloping contribution of
the endowments component in panel (a) of Figure 3.4. For instance, changes in the
number of households who refinanced contributed to a 0.8 percentage point increase
in the 90/10 ratio and an increase of 1.6 in the 95/10 ratio. In contrast, changes
in the returns to refinancing – that is, the e↵ect of refinancing at a lower interest
rate – only impacted the middle of the income distribution. As can be seen in panel
(b), the largest gains from obtaining refinancing went to households between the
50th and 80th percentiles, while the e↵ects on the tails of the distribution were not
significantly di↵erent from zero. Adding these two components together, the overall
contribution of refinancing to inequality is modestly positive (see row 5 of Table 3.2),
though not statistically significant for any of the distributional measures considered.
Taking a step back, the decomposition results support the proposition that the
disequalizing e↵ects of increasing equity returns outweighed the equalizing e↵ects of
falling unemployment during the post-QE period. Netting out the equalizing impact
of declining unemployment, the estimated impact of increasing equity returns on the
95/10 ratio is still around 6 percentage points. If this were the end of the story the
unavoidable conclusion would be that QE, and expansionary monetary policy more
generally during this period, greatly contributed to rising inequality. However, this
conclusion is incorrect since the decomposition results only account for the observed
changes in the explanatory variables and are completely silent on the counterfactual
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changes in these variables that would have been observed in the absence of QE. We
address this issue in Section 3.6 below.
3.5.1 Contribution to growth of real median income
Although the combined contributions of all three channels – financial returns,
declining unemployment, and mortgage refinancing – appear to have increased in-
equality between the two periods, it is important to emphasize that these channels
nevertheless boosted real median income. Indeed, while median income growth was
flat during the post-QE period, as reported in the second to last column of Table 3.2,
the three QE channels contributed a net 3 percentage points to median real income.
Put di↵erently, the contribution of the three QE channels o↵set a 3 percent decline
of median income.
Mortgage refinancing played the biggest role, contributing 2.8 percentage points.
This reflects both changes in the volume of refinancing (the endowments component)
and reduced borrowing costs (the coe cients component). Assuming that the de-
mand for credit has remained more or less constant between the two periods, the
increase in refinancing rates implies an improvement in credit availability. These im-
proved credit conditions contributed nearly 1.1 percentage points to median income
growth. At the same time, a fall in mortgage rates boosted median net income by
lightening households’ debt burden. This e↵ect contributed around 1.7 percentage
points to median income growth.
In contrast, financial asset returns had no significant e↵ect on median income.
Although the combined contribution of financial asset returns on median net income
was -1.2 percentage points, led by the falling returns on short-term / liquid financial
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assets, these estimates are not statistically significant at standard confidence levels.
Finally, increased employment contributed nearly half a percentage point to real
median income growth.
3.6 Counterfactual scenarios
As already noted, while our decomposition provides a detailed picture of the
contribution of each channel to the actual change in the distribution of net income
between the two periods, it lacks a causal interpretation. This is because the decom-
position was carried out using the observed changes in the independent variables and
not the counterfactual changes that would have prevailed had the Federal Reserve
abstained from intervening to boost employment and prop up financial markets.
In other words, our decomposition estimates do not answer the question: “what
would the distribution of income look like if the Federal Reserve had not undertaken
QE?” Nevertheless, it is possible to use the decomposition estimates to provide a
precise framing of the relative magnitudes of each causal channel under alternative
counterfactual scenarios. This requires making assumptions about the path of, say,
unemployment in the hypothetical absence of QE; or about changes in stock returns
had QE not taken place.
Though not settling the issue of causality, this exercise places well defined upper
and lower bounds on the e↵ects of QE, as well as the net tradeo↵ between equity re-
turns – which, as we have seen, led to dramatic increases in inequality – and changes
in employment, which modestly decreased inequality. What emerges from this exer-
cise is that for QE to have actually decreased inequality relative to a hypothetical
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counterfactual, it is necessary to either strongly downplay the potential impact of
QE on stock returns or assume very large employment e↵ects. In other words, it is
necessary to either assume that the large disequalizing impact of stock returns was
mostly not due to QE but a “normal” feature of the economic recovery, or that the
Federal Reserve prevented an implausibly large increase in the unemployment rate.
Consider the “causal” e↵ect of QE on channel k for a given inequality statistic,
 ˜k =  k   Ck
where  Ck denotes the counterfactual change of channel k (e.g. the change in employ-
ment that would have taken place without QE). To focus on the most controversial
channels, let’s consider the contribution of changes in the return of owning stocks
(  S) and changes in employment ( X¯E). For simplicity, let’s assume that coun-
terfactual stock returns can be modeled by replacing the estimated change in the
return on stocks (  S) with a parameter ✓ that stands for the percentage increase in
stock prices due to QE. That is, we assume that the “causal” contribution of stock
returns is given by:
 ˜ ,S = ✓ ˆ0,SX¯0,S (3.9)
where  ˆ0,S is the return on stocks during the pre-QE period.12 Intuitively, equation
(3.9) yields the causal contribution of QE to inequality through stock returns if one
assumes that QE was responsible for a ✓ percent increase in stock prices.
12Algebraically, this follows from the definition of the change in the return on stocks and of ✓,
which is the percentage change. Since ( ˆ1,S    ˆ0,S)/ ˆ0,S = ✓, it is easy to see that   S = ✓ ˆ0,S .
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Turning next to the employment channel, it is extremely likely that unemploy-
ment would have continued to increase, instead of slowly coming down, in the absence
of QE. We do not take a stand on precisely how much employment would have hypo-
thetically decreased but instead present a range of estimates for the e↵ect of QE via
employment based on counterfactual levels of employment. Below we will discuss
estimates reported in the literature and how these translate into contributions to
inequality in our framework. Specifically, starting with the definition of the endow-
ment component for employment in the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, we replace
the change in mean endowments,  X¯E, with the hypothetical change causally at-
tributable to QE,  X¯E    X¯CE . The causal contribution of QE to inequality via
employment is thus given by:
 ˜X,E =  ˜X¯E  ˆ0,E (3.10)
where  ˆ0,E is the RIF regression coe cient for employment during t = 0. Combining
the e↵ects of stock returns and employment, we arrive at the net e↵ect QE relative
to the counterfactual:
 ˜ =  ˜X,U +  ˜ ,S (3.11)
Using the decomposition results, we consider two counterfactual exercises to assess
the plausibility that QE may have decreased or increased inequality given these
well defined impacts on employment and stock returns. Specifically, we take the
coe cients from the RIF regressions and combine them with alternative assumptions
about changes in endowments and returns to calculate the hypothetical contribution
of QE to inequality under various counterfactual scenarios.
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Figure 3.5: Impact of QE relative to various counterfactual scenarios
(a) Contribution to 95/10 ratio
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Note: Panel (a) shows the net contribution of QE to the 99/10 ratio through its e↵ect on em-
ployment and stock returns under alternative scenarios about the causal impact of QE on these
two channels. The “return to trend” scenario assumes that all observed stock returns were due
to stock prices returning to their trend level (✓ = 0). The “5 percent” scenario assumes that QE
increased stock prices by 5 percent. The 10 and 20 percent scenarios are defined analogously. Panel
(b) reports the combinations of stock return and employment e↵ects that yield a zero net impact
on inequality. In both panels, “employment e↵ect” refers to the hypothetical causal impact of QE
on employment relative to the counterfactual absence of QE ( X¯E   X¯CE ). In panel (b), “stock
returns e↵ect” refers to the percentage increase in stock prices causally attributable to QE.
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First, we examine the net causal contribution to inequality as a function of the
causal e↵ect of QE on employment ( X¯E  X¯CE ) holding constant the e↵ect on stock
returns at di↵erent levels. This exercise is intended to answer the question: “how
much would QE have contributed to inequality if its causal impact on employment
had been x points and we assume that QE was responsible for a y percent increase in
stock prices?” Thus, panel (a) of Figure 3.5 graphs the net contribution to the 95/10
ratio ( ˜) as a function of the hypothetical causal e↵ect on the employment rate
( ˜X,U), holding constant the causal e↵ect of QE on stock returns (✓ ˆ0,SX¯0,S). As in
the decomposition figures presented above, the vertical axis measures the percentage
point change in inequality due to the factors under consideration. We consider four
alternative scenarios for stock prices in this exercise. The “return to trend” scenario
makes the extreme assumption that none of the stock price growth observed during
the recovery is causally attributable to QE and instead simply reflects the stock
prices returning to their pre-crisis trend. This scenario is broadly compatible with
Bernanke’s views (cited above) and corresponds to setting ✓ = 0. We then consider
three intermediate scenarios where QE was causally responsible for 5, 10, and 20
percent increases in stock prices.
Second, we consider the locus of combinations of employment and stock returns
e↵ects necessary for the contribution of QE to inequality to equal zero. This second
exercise answers questions of the type: “If QE had a zero causal impact on inequality,
what combinations of stock returns and employment e↵ects are consistent with this
zero impact?” Phrased di↵erently, this exercise answers: “If we assume that QE was
only responsible for a y percent change in stock prices, how big does the e↵ect on
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employment need to be to ensure a zero net impact on inequality?” Concretely, this
exercise simply consists of setting  ˜ = 0 from equation (3.11) and graphing the zero
locus in ( ˜X¯E, ✓)-space. This is shown in panel (b) of Figure 3.5.
Although the jury is still out on the overall macroeconomic impact of QE, there
have been a number of studies quantifying its e↵ects on employment and stock prices.
These are thoroughly reviewed in Bivens [14]. A general reading of this literature
is that QE had non-trivial e↵ects on the unemployment rate and relatively modest
e↵ects on stock prices. Using estimates of the e↵ect of QE on the term-premium and
simulations based-on the Federal Reserves’ FRB-US model, Chung et al. [26] report
that QE likely lowered the unemployment rate by 1.5 percentage points. Engen et
al. [37] report estimates ranging from a 0.8 percentage point decrease to an upper
bound of 1.5 points, with a baseline impact of 1.2. Estimates of the impact of QE
on stock prices come from event-style studies measuring the response of stock prices
to surprise monetary policy announcements related to QE (Rosa [107], Rogers et
al. [105], Kiley [70], Engen et al. [37]). In these types of studies, stock prices are
estimated to have grown between 3 percent to around 9 percent because of QE.13
Considering these estimates for the employment and stock prices e↵ects, QE
would have mildly increased inequality or have had an approximately neutral e↵ect.
Taking the 5 percent causal e↵ect on stock prices scenario as the baseline (the solid
black curve in panel (a) of Figure 3.5), it is evident that the net contribution of
13One limitation of these estimates is that event-studies, by design, only capture the response of
stock prices during the immediate time-period of the policy announcement and as such may not
capture the full e↵ect of QE, via, for example, general financial market conditions. Due to this
uncertainty, event-studies may understate the full e↵ect of QE on stock prices.
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Table 3.3: Counterfactual contributions to the 95/10 ratio under various scenarios
Employment e↵ect ( ˜X¯)
1 pp 2 pp 3 pp 4 pp
Equity Return Scenarios (✓)
0% scenario -0.3 -0.6 -1.0 -1.3
5% scenario 0.6 0.3 0.0 -0.4
10% scenario 1.5 1.2 0.9 0.6
20% scenario 3.4 3.1 2.8 2.5
Note: This table reports the combined contribution of returns to equities and changes in the
employment rate to the 95/10 ratio under various counterfactual scenarios. The contributions
are presented as percentage changes. Each counterfactual contribution is calculated according to
equation (3.11) in the text. A one pp employment e↵ect refers to a one percentage point causal
change in the employment rate.
QE to inequality through employment and stock returns is positive for a substantial
range of e↵ects on employment. For example, let’s consider the net contribution to
inequality assuming that the causal e↵ect of QE on employment was 1.2 percentage
points. This change in employment is consistent with the baseline estimates reported
by Engen et al. [37]. As can be seen in panel (a), this corresponds to a 0.5 percentage
point increase to the 95/10 ratio under the 5 percent stock returns scenario, a 1.5
percentage point contribution under the 10 percent scenario, and as high as 3.4
percentage points under the 20 percent scenario.
Indeed, under the 5 percent stock returns scenario, the contribution to the 95/10
ratio only becomes negative for assumed employment e↵ects exceeding 3 percentage
points, which is more than double the baseline e↵ect reported by Engen et al. [37].
Making the less conservative assumption that 10 percent of the change in stock re-
turns was due to QE, the employment e↵ects necessary to yield a neutral or negative
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impact on inequality become highly implausible. Perhaps the easiest way to appreci-
ate the tradeo↵ between the equalizing e↵ects of employment and the disequalizing
e↵ects of stock returns is by looking at panel (b) of Figure 3.5. There, the solid
black curve plots the combinations of stock return e↵ects and employment e↵ects
that are consistent with a neutral QE impact on inequality. A 1.2 percentage point
employment e↵ect would only result in a zero net impact on inequality if as little
as 3.2 percent of the change in stock prices were attributable to QE. These points
are also illustrated in Table 3.3, which reports the combined contribution of equity
returns and changes in employment under various counterfactual scenarios.
3.7 Concluding Remarks
The unavoidable conclusion from the detailed decomposition exercise and the
counterfactual analysis carried out above is that the impact of quantitative easing on
the distribution income was at least modestly regressive. Our decomposition results
imply that the disequalizing e↵ects of equity returns far outweighed the equalizing
e↵ects of employment gains. While these decomposition results cannot be interpreted
causally, the counterfactual scenarios presented in the previous section suggest that,
for reasonable assumptions about the employment e↵ects of QE, the causal impact
of QE on stock prices would have to be implausibly small for the net e↵ect to be
distributionally neutral.
These dis-equalizing impacts were due to both policy choices and deep seated
structural problems. Policy wise, the Federal Reserve and Treasury Department did
not design e↵ective mechanisms to clear away obstacles for lower income households
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to refinance loans at lower rates. As Bair [5] and Barofsky [7] show, helping under-
water homeowners refinance their mortgages or stay in their homes was not a top
priority of the Treasury Department. Nor did the Federal Reserve try to implement
any regulatory programs to do so. In addition, the Federal Reserve did not try to
develop innovative programs to use its lending facilities to lend directly to state and
local governments or others who would preserve or expand employment. This direct
lending could have lessened the Fed’s dependence on bidding up asset prices in an
attempt to generate employment and wage increases.
Finally, while our results tend to support the critics who argue that QE did
increase inequality, there is nothing in our analysis which supports those who argue
that raising interest rates will have a desirable, equalizing impact. Tighter monetary
policy would likely reduce employment growth, and make mortgage refinancing more
expensive. While it might reduce asset price growth and raise returns on short term
assets, the employment and refinancing impacts are likely to be dominant as earlier
work on monetary policy and income distribution has demonstrated (e.g. Coibion
[27]).
This suggests a paradox. Given the current structure of the economy and mon-
etary policy strategies, both loose and tight monetary policy are likely to be dis-
equalizing. Future research should focus on better understanding the reason for
this paradoxical situation. It is likely that more direct tools of monetary policy are
needed. Perhaps more importantly, fiscal policy, and labor market policies such as
changes in labor laws, tax laws, and minimum wage legislation will be needed to
reduce the massive levels of inequality that we are experiencing today.
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A.1 ECMs with additional capital control measures
This appendix presents additional error-correction models with finer breakdowns
of capital control transaction categories. Tables A.1 and A.2 report the error-
correction term and its interaction with various measures of capital controls. The
ECM specification is the same as the benchmark specification (1.2). Each specifi-
cation in Tables A.1 and A.2 features a di↵erent Schindler subindex corresponding
to the presence of restrictions on a financial instrument category j. The full list of
instruments reported are: equities, bonds, money market accounts, and collective in-
vestment instruments. For controls on capital inflows, IN refers to average controls
on capital inflows, while PLBN and SIAR, respectively, stand for restrictions on
the purchase locally by non-residents and the sale or issue abroad by residents. For
controls on capital outflows, OUT refers to average restrictions on capital outflows.
SILN stands for “sale or issue locally by non-residents” while PABR stands for
“purchase abroad by residents.”
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A.2 Sample List
Industrial – Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada Cyprus, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Malta, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United
States.
Europe and Central Asia – Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Georgia, Hungary, Kaza-
khstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Moldova, Russia, Slovenia, Turkey.
East Asia and Pacific – Brunei Darussalam, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Re-
public of Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand.
Latin America and Caribbean – Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela.
Middle East and North Africa – Bahrain, , Egypt, Israel, Kuwait Lebanon,
Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Republic of
Yemen.
South Asia – Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka.
Sub-Saharan Africa – Angola, Burkina Faso, Coˆte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Mauritius,
South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia.
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A.3 Exchange Rate Regime Classification
Data on de facto exchange rate regime classifications was obtained from Ilzetzki
et al. [60]. Details on the di↵erent classification codes are provided in Table A.3.
Following Eguren [34], “floating” regimes are those with category codes 10 through
13. Freely falling regimes (code 14) and dual market regimes with missing data (code
15) are excluded from the analysis.
Table A.3: Ilzetzki et al. [60] de facto exchange rate regime classification
Code Description
1 No separate legal tender
2 Pre announced peg or currency board ar-
rangement
3 Pre announced horizontal band that is nar-
rower than or equal to +/-2%
4 De facto peg
5 Pre announced crawling peg
6 Pre announced crawling band that is nar-
rower than or equal to +/-2%
7 De factor crawling peg
8 De facto crawling band that is narrower than
or equal to +/-2%
9 Pre announced crawling band that is wider
than or equal to +/-2%
10 De facto crawling band that is narrower than
or equal to +/-5%
11 Moving band that is narrower than or equal
to +/-2% (i.e., allows for both appreciation
and depreciation over time)
12 Managed floating
13 Freely floating
14 Freely falling
15 Dual market in which parallel market data is
missing.
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A.4 Inflation Targeting Countries
Table A.4: List of inflation targeting countries and year of adoption
Country Year of Adoption
New Zealand 1990
Canada 1991
United Kingdom 1992
Australia 1993
Sweden 1993
Czech Republic 1997
Israel 1997
Poland 1998
Brazil 1999
Chile 1999
Colombia 1999
South Africa 2000
Thailand 2000
Hungary 2001
Mexico 2001
Iceland 2001
Korea, Republic of 2001
Norway 2001
Peru 2002
Philippines 2002
Guatemala 2005
Indonesia 2005
Romania 2005
Serbia 2006
Turkey 2006
Armenia 2006
Ghana 2007
Note: This table reports the list of countries with an inflation targeting regime and
the year this regime was adopted, as presented in Roger [104].
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Figure B.1: Country-specific error-correction speeds and average capital controls
(a) Overall
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(b) Inflows
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(c) Outflows
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Note: This figure shows scatter plots and
fitted values of the estimated country-specific
error-correction terms against various mea-
sure of capital controls. The shaded area
represents the 95 percent confidence interval.
The error-correction term is obtained from
a country-specific regression of the following
form:  eˆi,t = ✓ieˆi,t 1+↵i,0+ui,t, where eˆi,t
are the residuals from specification (4) in Ta-
ble 1.5 and ✓i is the error-correction term for
country i.
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Table C.1: Description of covariates
Variable Definition
Employment Indicator variable for the employment sta-
tus of the head of the household.
Equity Ownership Indicator for whether or not the household
holds any type of equity, either directly or
indirectly through mutual funds.
Bonds, directly held Indicator for whether or not the household
directly owns any bonds.
Short-term / liquid assets Indicator for owning any short-term or liq-
uid assets. These include checking ac-
counts, cash, certificates of deposit, and
other liquid assets.
Mortgage refinancing Indicator for whether or not the house-
hold obtained refinancing for their pri-
mary mortgage during the previous three
years.
College Indicator for whether the head of the
household has completed college.
Age Age, in years, of the household head.
Credit denial / fear of denial Indicator for whether or not the household
has been denied or feared being denied
credit during the previous 5 years.
Bankruptcy Indicator for whether or not the household
filed for bankruptcy during the previous 5
years.
Race Categorical variable indicating the stated
race of the household head.
Table C.2: Covariate means – before and after QE
Pre-QE (2008-10) Post-QE (2011-13) Change
Employment 0.929 0.941 0.012
Equities 0.193 0.192 -0.011
Bonds 0.016 0.014 -0.002
Short-term / liquid assets 0.926 0.932 0.006
Mortgage refinancing 0.093 0.125 0.032
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Table C.3: Detailed decomposition results by distributional statistic
Dependent Variable: Net Income (IHT)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
90/10 95/10 90/50 50/10 Gini
Overall
Pre-QE 2.467⇤⇤⇤ 2.869⇤⇤⇤ 1.232⇤⇤⇤ 1.235⇤⇤⇤ 0.600⇤⇤⇤
(0.024) (0.030) (0.019) (0.019) (0.007)
Post-QE 2.422⇤⇤⇤ 2.819⇤⇤⇤ 1.184⇤⇤⇤ 1.238⇤⇤⇤ 0.583⇤⇤⇤
(0.026) (0.029) (0.019) (0.017) (0.006)
Change 0.045 0.050 0.048⇤ -0.003 0.016⇤
(0.033) (0.043) (0.028) (0.026) (0.009)
Endowments ( X)
Employment -0.005⇤⇤ -0.004⇤⇤⇤ -0.002⇤⇤⇤ -0.003⇤⇤ -0.001⇤⇤⇤
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Equities -0.007⇤ -0.010⇤ -0.005⇤ -0.002⇤ -0.002⇤
(0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Bonds -0.003 -0.007 -0.003 -0.000 -0.002
(0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002)
Short-term Assets -0.006⇤ -0.007 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Mortgage Refinancing 0.008⇤⇤ 0.016⇤⇤⇤ 0.003 0.006⇤⇤⇤ 0.001
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Coe cients (  )
Employment 0.037 -0.033 0.047 -0.010 -0.005
(0.147) (0.168) (0.063) (0.130) (0.029)
Equities 0.041⇤⇤ 0.063⇤⇤ 0.020 0.021⇤ 0.013⇤
(0.020) (0.030) (0.018) (0.011) (0.007)
Bonds 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.004
(0.005) (0.010) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005)
Short-term Assets 0.175 0.201⇤ -0.035 0.210⇤ -0.002
(0.113) (0.115) (0.039) (0.116) (0.010)
Mortgage Refinancing 0.012 -0.004 -0.004 0.016⇤⇤⇤ -0.002
(0.012) (0.020) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005)
Constant -0.317 -0.298 0.078 -0.396⇤⇤ -0.005
(0.210) (0.252) (0.093) (0.199) (0.033)
Note: This table reports the results from the detailed decomposition for various distributional
statistics. Detailed decomposition results for the interaction component are not reported. Each
specification corresponds to the results reported in Figures 3.2 - 3.4. Every model includes standard
demographic controls, including age, race, education, as well as household access to credit. Boot-
strapped standard errors with 300 repetitions are reported in parentheses (⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05,
⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01).
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Table C.4: Detailed decomposition results by quantile, bottom half of the distribution
Dependent Variable: Net Income (IHT)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Q = 10 Q = 20 Q = 40 Q = 50
Overall
Pre-QE 10.044⇤⇤⇤ 10.461⇤⇤⇤ 11.039⇤⇤⇤ 11.275⇤⇤⇤
(0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.008)
Post-QE 10.029⇤⇤⇤ 10.471⇤⇤⇤ 11.051⇤⇤⇤ 11.272⇤⇤⇤
(0.019) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009)
Change 0.015 -0.010 -0.012 0.003
(0.025) (0.014) (0.015) (0.012)
Endowments ( X)
Employment 0.007⇤⇤⇤ 0.007⇤⇤⇤ 0.005⇤⇤⇤ 0.004⇤⇤⇤
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Equities -0.003⇤⇤⇤ -0.004⇤⇤⇤ -0.005⇤⇤⇤ -0.006⇤⇤⇤
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Bonds -0.000⇤ -0.000⇤ -0.000 -0.001⇤
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Short-term Assets 0.006⇤⇤⇤ 0.006⇤⇤⇤ 0.004⇤⇤⇤ 0.004⇤⇤⇤
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Mortgage Refinancing 0.005⇤⇤⇤ 0.008⇤⇤⇤ 0.010⇤⇤⇤ 0.011⇤⇤⇤
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Coe cients (  )
Employment -0.127 -0.261⇤⇤⇤ -0.205⇤⇤⇤ -0.166⇤⇤⇤
(0.094) (0.061) (0.047) (0.041)
Equities -0.018⇤⇤⇤ 0.001 0.002 -0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Bonds -0.002⇤⇤ 0.001 -0.000 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Short-term Assets -0.268⇤⇤ -0.139⇤⇤ 0.030 -0.007
(0.124) (0.067) (0.037) (0.031)
Mortgage Refinancing 0.003 0.010⇤⇤ 0.018⇤⇤⇤ 0.017⇤⇤⇤
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant 0.510⇤⇤ 0.376⇤⇤⇤ 0.042 0.058
(0.209) (0.104) (0.060) (0.056)
Note: This table reports the results from the detailed decomposition for the bottom half of the
distribution. Detailed decomposition results for the interaction component are not reported. Each
specification corresponds to the results reported in Figures 3.2 - 3.4. Every model includes standard
demographic controls, including age, race, education, as well as household access to credit. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses (⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01).
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Table C.5: Detailed decomposition results by quantile, top half of the distribution
Dependent Variable: Net Income (IHT)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Q = 60 Q = 80 Q = 90 Q = 95
Overall
Pre-QE 11.509⇤⇤⇤ 12.064⇤⇤⇤ 12.496⇤⇤⇤ 12.910⇤⇤⇤
(0.008) (0.009) (0.015) (0.016)
Post-QE 11.508⇤⇤⇤ 12.025⇤⇤⇤ 12.469⇤⇤⇤ 12.861⇤⇤⇤
(0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.015)
Change 0.000 0.038⇤⇤ 0.027 0.049⇤⇤
(0.013) (0.015) (0.023) (0.022)
Endowments ( X)
Employment 0.004⇤⇤⇤ 0.002⇤⇤⇤ 0.003⇤⇤⇤ 0.003⇤⇤⇤
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Equities -0.006⇤⇤⇤ -0.009⇤⇤⇤ -0.011⇤⇤⇤ -0.014⇤⇤⇤
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Bonds -0.001⇤ -0.001⇤ -0.003⇤ -0.006⇤
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Short-term Assets 0.003⇤⇤⇤ 0.001⇤⇤⇤ 0.000⇤⇤ -0.001⇤⇤
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Mortgage Refinancing 0.012⇤⇤⇤ 0.012⇤⇤⇤ 0.013⇤⇤⇤ 0.021⇤⇤⇤
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Coe cients (  )
Employment -0.152⇤⇤⇤ -0.051⇤ -0.121⇤⇤⇤ -0.197⇤⇤⇤
(0.038) (0.030) (0.040) (0.045)
Equities 0.002 0.005 0.021⇤ 0.047⇤⇤⇤
(0.007) (0.008) (0.012) (0.018)
Bonds -0.003⇤⇤⇤ -0.003 -0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006)
Short-term Assets -0.001 -0.081⇤⇤⇤ -0.028⇤ -0.001
(0.029) (0.016) (0.016) (0.021)
Mortgage Refinancing 0.021⇤⇤⇤ 0.018⇤⇤⇤ 0.014⇤ -0.000
(0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.010)
Constant -0.028 0.053 0.064 0.092
(0.062) (0.044) (0.064) (0.078)
Note: This table reports the results from the detailed decomposition for the top half of the
distribution. Detailed decomposition results for the interaction component are not reported. Each
specification corresponds to the results reported in Figures 3.2 - 3.4. Every model includes standard
demographic controls, including age, race, education, as well as household access to credit. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses (⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01).
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